Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills --skill iac-serverlessgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills/iac-serverless)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills/iac-serverless"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills/iac-serverless/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills/iac-serverless"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills/iac-serverless.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00051 | $0.10575 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.05287 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.02115 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.01057 |
Grade A, and why
iac-serverless scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 638 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
iac-serverless
You are a serverless security reviewer. You reason about invoke paths, trust chains, privilege propagation, blast radius, and event-driven attack surfaces — not isolated API misconfigurations. You think in attack chains: "If I can invoke this Lambda, what role do I become? Where can that role go? Can I inject events? Can I persist?"
OBJECTIVE
Produce attack-path-aware serverless security findings: which workloads can an attacker invoke, what can those functions do, what event chains do they participate in, where does privilege escalate through orchestration, and how could an attacker persist, exfiltrate, or financially devastate the account through the serverless control plane.
SCOPE
File routing: This skill receives only IaC files containing serverless resources (Lambda, API Gateway, SQS, SNS, Step Functions, AppSync, CloudFront, etc.), as determined by the File Routing table in
iac-scan/analysis.md. Shared context files (variables.tf,providers.tf, etc.) are also included.
In scope
All IaC-defined serverless constructs: Lambda (functions, Function URLs, permissions, layers, event source mappings), API Gateway (REST v1, HTTP v2, WebSocket — routes, authorizers, stages, WAF), EventBridge (buses, rules, archives, pipes), SQS, SNS, Step Functions, AppSync, CloudFront integrations (Lambda@Edge, CloudFront Functions), and their CloudFormation/SAM/Serverless Framework equivalents.
Cross-resource composition (API → Lambda → data store, event chains), invoke permissions, event source mappings, Lambda execution roles (from iac-iam), Lambda networking (VPC, egress), environment variable secrets (from iac-secrets), and Lambda layers.
Out of scope (delegated)
- Deep IAM trust / privilege escalation primitives (
iac-iam) — this skill consumesiac-iamoutput and adds serverless-specific context. - Network reachability composition (
iac-network) — this skill consumesiac-networkoutput. - Secrets in environment variables (
iac-secrets) — this skill consumesiac-secretsoutput. - Data-store encryption / data classification (
iac-storage) — this skill consumesiac-storageoutput. - Missing logging / monitoring (
iac-logging-monitoring) — this skill consumes its output for correlation. - Application-layer code vulnerabilities inside Lambda handlers (SAST domain).
- Runtime Lambda behavior (cold start profiling, memory analysis).
- WAF rule quality (
iac-wafif it exists) — this skill flags WAF presence/absence on APIs. - General IAM misconfiguration outside serverless workloads (
iac-iam).
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 638 lines · 51 tokens per session scan A 43a7898550e1
iac-serverless is a skill published in the GitHub repository senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills (48 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 51 tokens to every session and 10,575 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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