assemble-lib-rules

A procedure for connecting security rules that identify dangerous inputs and outputs across libraries. A vulnerability class is a category of security flaw, and these connections show how data can travel from a source to a sink.

In plain words
What is it for?
Reading source and sink rules, matching them by vulnerability class, and writing project-level joins for the target programming language.
Why use it?
Library rules may exist separately, so the security scanner needs join rules to relate them and include them with its built-in rules.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/seqra/opentaint/assemble-lib-rules
Any agent
npx skills add seqra/opentaint --skill assemble-lib-rules
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/seqra/opentaint

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 38 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,623 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00038 $0.01623
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00812
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00325
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00162

Measured 3d ago against content hash 4c89726fb78d, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

assemble-lib-rules scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/assemble-lib-rules/SKILL.md · 115 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 115 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Skill: Assemble Lib Rules

Source and sink library rules are authored per package but never paired across them. Write the security joins that pair them — one per vuln class, each merging the created source/sink rules with the built-ins, mirroring the built-in security rules. The joins carry no test project, the main scan verifies them.

Inputs

Provided by the caller, fall back to the default value when omitted. Ask back only when a required input is missing and has no sensible default

  • project-root (optional) — root of the target project. Opentaint keeps all analysis artifacts under the fixed <project-root>/.opentaint/ directory, so every .opentaint/... path below resolves there. Default: current directory
  • language (required) — target language for this project and language-specific instructions

Workflow

1. Read the created lib rules and the built-ins

Read every source unit under .opentaint/tracking/rules/sources/ and sink unit under .opentaint/tracking/rules/sinks/ — the rule_ids already recorded, the sinks carrying their vuln_class — and the built-in source/sink lib rules:

opentaint health --rules

Collect every source rule (built-in + created) and every sink rule grouped by vuln class. A rule is built-in when its ref resolves in the loaded built-in ruleset, created otherwise — that membership, not a stored tag, tells the two apart.

When join files already exist from a prior run, reuse them as the baseline: re-assemble to fold in any new lib rule — a new source widens the on of every join for its vuln class, a new sink adds a join — and leave a join whose wiring no new rule touches as-is. Don't rewrite joins that already hold.

2. Write one security join per (vuln class, sink rule)

A join references exactly ONE sink rule — several sinks can't merge into one join. So a vuln class with more than one relevant sink becomes several joins: one per sink rule, each refing all the relevant sources on the left. Sources are many, the sink is always one.

Read the full file on GitHub · 115 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 115 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 4c89726fb78d

Subscribe to this mod's changes

assemble-lib-rules is a skill published in the GitHub repository seqra/opentaint (149 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 1,623 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

plugin-code-review-orchestrated

Orchestrates a code review of the spring-plugin repository through scope/context passes, routing, domain reviewer subskills, and per-artifact validation. Use when asked to review a PR, diff, commit, branch, module, or file set, to run a full orchestrated review, or to produce a validated review report.

explyt/spring-plugin · 72 tokens

github-issue-manager

Classifies a user request as Bug, Compatibility, Feature, Question, or Task for the explyt/spring-plugin GitHub repo, lightly researches the relevant codebase, searches similar existing issues, and either reports an existing issue or creates a correctly titled and labeled one following the repository issue forms. Use…

explyt/spring-plugin · 97 tokens

review-async-lifecycle

Normative reviewer for EDT safety, coroutines, cancellation, read/write actions, disposal, listeners and async lifecycle in the explyt spring-plugin. Use during orchestrated code review when the diff touches threading, background tasks, read or write actions, listeners, MessageBus, Disposable ownership or progress…

explyt/spring-plugin · 66 tokens

review-core-correctness

Normative mandatory reviewer for correctness, contracts, architecture sanity, UX behavior, code quality and tests in the explyt spring-plugin codebase. Use during orchestrated code review of a PR, diff, commit or branch, or when asked to review correctness, logic, architecture or test coverage of plugin changes.

explyt/spring-plugin · 67 tokens

review-findings-validator

Normative per-artifact validator: reads exactly one reviewer artifact, re-verifies every claim against real source code, classifies findings as TP, FP, or Need more data, and writes exactly one validated artifact. Use during the validation wave of an orchestrated code review, when asked to validate reviewer findings…

explyt/spring-plugin · 77 tokens

review-persistence-security-resources

Normative reviewer for persistence, settings, secrets, logging hygiene, resources, caches, cross-platform behavior and long-lived state in the explyt/spring-plugin IntelliJ plugin. Use when reviewing changes that touch PersistentStateComponent, settings UI, credentials, caches, service fields, logging, file paths…

explyt/spring-plugin · 83 tokens