ai-jailbreak-system-prompts

ai-jailbreak-system-prompts is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge. It costs 38 tokens per session (896 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A collection of techniques for testing whether a large language model can be coaxed into ignoring its safety rules and system instructions. It uses crafted prompts, role-play scenarios, fictional settings, and encoded text.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to plan and run red-team tests against an AI model, record successful outputs, and test edge cases. It requires access to the system and an authorized testing scope.
Why use it?
It helps authorized security testers check whether an AI system can be made to produce harmful or restricted content. This can reveal weaknesses in chatbots, assistants, and AI data-processing systems.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is - [`_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md`](../_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md) — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patte.

Good fit Use it to plan and run red-team tests against an AI model, record successful outputs, and test edge cases. It requires access to the system and an authorized testing scope.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ai-jailbreak-system-prompts

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for ai-jailbreak-system-prompts

README.md
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for ai-jailbreak-system-prompts

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ai-jailbreak-system-prompts"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ai-jailbreak-system-prompts.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 38 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 896 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00038 $0.00896
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00448
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00179
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00090

Measured 11d ago against content hash 1301c1a9aafb, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

ai-jailbreak-system-prompts scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.

The scan reads SKILL.md. This mod also ships 1 executable file (scripts/process.py), listed below but not scanned — reading those needs a real analyzer, not pattern matching.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

Copies of this mod

1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:

skills/curated/ai-jailbreak-system-prompts/SKILL.md · 115 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 115 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

AI Jailbreaking & System Prompt Bypasses

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments of Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated into chatbots, virtual assistants, or backend AI data processing pipelines.
  • To demonstrate how instruction-tuned models can be forced into producing harmful, unethical, or restricted outputs by carefully crafting adversarial prompts.

Prerequisites

  • Access to target AI/ML system or local model deployment for testing
  • Python 3.9+ with relevant ML libraries (transformers, torch, openai)
  • Understanding of LLM architecture and prompt processing pipelines
  • Authorized scope and rules of engagement for AI red team testing

Workflow

Phase 1: Understanding Target Model Constraints

# Concept: LLM safety filters ```

### Phase 2: Persona Adoption Attacks

```text
# ```

### Phase 3: Developer Mode & Fictional Scenarios

```text
# ```

### Phase 4: Payload Encoding & Obfuscation

```text
# ```

#### Decision Point 🔀
```mermaid
flowchart TD
    A[Craft Prompt ] --> B{Bypass Successful ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Capture Output ]
    B -->|No| D[Refine Approach ]
    C --> E[Test Edge Cases ]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

  • Filter Ensembling: Context Monitoring: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Ai Jailbreak System Prompts — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Findings Summary:
  [Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
  [Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]

Detailed Results:
  Phase 1: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

  Phase 2: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
  1. [Immediate remediation step]
  2. [Long-term hardening measure]
  3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]

Read the full file on GitHub · 115 lines

Files

What ships with it

2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 11d ago First seen · 115 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 1301c1a9aafb

Subscribe to this mod's changes

ai-jailbreak-system-prompts is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 896 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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