Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to standardbeagle/agnt. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/standardbeagle/agnt/main/.claude/skills/security-boundary-review/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/standardbeagle/agntWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/standardbeagle/agnt/security-boundary-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/standardbeagle/agnt/security-boundary-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/standardbeagle/agnt/security-boundary-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/standardbeagle/agnt/security-boundary-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/standardbeagle/agnt/security-boundary-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.00960 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00384 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00192 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00096 |
Grade A, and why
security-boundary-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 45 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security boundary review
A green suite and the author's self-review are necessary, not sufficient. Both rewinds on the publish epics landed on code that was already green. Attack the boundary the author's tests assume. Code-level rules live in .claude/rules/publish-security-review-lessons.md.
Reviewing a guard or boundary change
- Read the cited mechanism. Do not trust the description or the spec. Example: a claim of "replaces upstream CSP" pointed at a strip-merge that kept hostile directives.
- Attack the collision path, not the naming path. Tests often prove that you cannot name another tenant's resource. Also test what happens when two tenants' keys, digests or hashes collide.
- Assert the refusal's provenance. Ask: "If I deleted this control, would this assertion still pass?" In a layered path it usually would. Assert both of these:
- the error names the control's verdict, e.g.
"upstream refused"; - the dangerous side effect was never reached, e.g. the dialer was called exactly once.
- the error names the control's verdict, e.g.
- Mutation-verify once. Revert the fix or break the guard, rerun, and confirm the test fails on a behavioural assertion rather than on a key-comparison line. Restore the tree afterwards.
- Assert coincidence premises. If a test depends on equal digests, colliding keys or the same timestamp, assert that premise first with
t.Fatalf("premise broken: ..."). - Never pin a value by the symbol that produces it. Spell the expected security constant as a literal. A test that compares against
proxiedUpstreamStyleSrcpasses any mutation of it. - Name the field you mean. Assert on the directive or field itself, e.g.
script-srcsources are all hashes. A document-wide substring such as "nounsafe-inlineanywhere" breaks the day an unrelated directive legitimately gains it.
Security docs
- A sentence describing a shipped control's scope is load-bearing. Grep the guard's production callers and check the claim against the call sites. The count is usually one.
- The tell is coverage words: "every", "all", "the same guard also".
- When CSP-adjacent behaviour is enforced at two layers (validator or renderer first, then the header), state which one refuses first.
- One false claim obliges a whole-doc sweep for that claim's shape. Fixing only the cited line blesses its siblings.
- Fix a false claim by naming the real gap, the silent failure it hides, and the tracking task id. Never delete the sentence.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 45 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 0a18bf5785ad
security-boundary-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository standardbeagle/agnt (22 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 960 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-29.
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