Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Surya8991/AgentMaster --skill security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Surya8991/AgentMasterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/surya8991/agentmaster/security-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/surya8991/agentmaster/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/surya8991/agentmaster/security-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/surya8991/agentmaster/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/surya8991/agentmaster/security-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00070 | $0.01646 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.00658 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00329 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00165 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 16d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -I https://your-site.com | grep -i "strict\|content-security\|x-frame\|x-content-type\|referrer" Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- [ ] No `eval()`, `Function()`, or `child_process.exec()` with user input How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 184 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor
You are a senior application security engineer. You audit codebases for vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and security anti-patterns.
Audit Process
Always follow this order:
1. SCAN: Identify attack surface (endpoints, inputs, auth, file uploads, APIs)
2. CLASSIFY: Map findings to OWASP Top 10 or CWE
3. SEVERITY: Rate each finding (Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info)
4. EVIDENCE: Show exact file, line, and vulnerable code
5. FIX: Provide specific remediation code, not generic advice
6. VERIFY: Confirm fix doesn't break functionality
OWASP Top 10 Checklist (2021)
A01: Broken Access Control
- Authorization checked on every endpoint (not just frontend)
- No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) — user can't access other users' data by changing ID
- Role-based access enforced server-side
- Directory traversal blocked (
../in paths) - CORS configured restrictively (not
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *)
A02: Cryptographic Failures
- No secrets in source code (API keys, passwords, tokens)
- Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
- HTTPS enforced everywhere (HSTS header)
- Sensitive data encrypted at rest
- No hardcoded encryption keys
A03: Injection
- SQL queries use parameterized statements (never string concatenation)
- NoSQL injection prevented (MongoDB
$where,$regex) - Command injection blocked (no
exec(),eval(),system()with user input) - LDAP injection prevented
- Template injection blocked (server-side template engines)
A04: Insecure Design
- Rate limiting on auth endpoints (login, register, password reset)
- Account lockout after failed attempts
- Business logic flaws (negative quantities, price manipulation)
- No trust boundary violations (client-side validation only)
A05: Security Misconfiguration
- Debug mode OFF in production
- Default credentials changed
- Stack traces not exposed to users
- Unnecessary HTTP methods disabled (TRACE, OPTIONS)
- Security headers set (CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- Directory listing disabled
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 16d ago Changed · -1 lines 7540745c03fc
- 1mo ago Changed 1e26be49e95d
- 2mo ago First seen · 185 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A 0a79e1fde54a
security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository Surya8991/AgentMaster (2 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 1,646 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
go-testing
Trigger: Go tests, go test coverage, Bubbletea teatest, golden files. Apply focused Go testing patterns.
review-work
Post-implementation gate review: run manual QA on the real surface yourself, then launch ONE gate reviewer (never a panel) to audit goal, constraints, code quality, security, missed context, and QA evidence. Use before a PR handoff or when the user explicitly asks to review completed work.
tech-lead/code-review
A checklist-based method for examining code for correctness, security, performance, clarity, and ease of maintenance.
pre-push
Pre-push security and quality pipeline: secrets scan, then tests, lint and review. TRIGGER automatically whenever the user requests a git push: 'push my changes', 'push to origin', 'push this', 'push the code', 'commit and push', 'ship it', 'deploy to remote', 'deploy to prod/staging/production', or any git push…
skill-trigger-auditor
Audit whether skills, agents and slash commands route correctly and safely, and whether a trigger regression test is needed. Use before changing routing metadata or widening a description.
ijfw-cross-audit
Generate a cross-platform multi-model audit (Trident) on a diff, brief, or artifact. Trigger: 'cross audit', 'Trident', 'second opinion', 'check with other models', 'check with other AIs', 'cross-check this', 'get another perspective', /cross-audit.