Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/telagod/code-abyss/securing-cloud-and-supply-chainnpx skills add telagod/code-abyss --skill securing-cloud-and-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/telagod/code-abyssWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/telagod/code-abyss/securing-cloud-and-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/telagod/code-abyss/securing-cloud-and-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/telagod/code-abyss/securing-cloud-and-supply-chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00085 | $0.01328 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00664 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00266 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00133 |
Grade A, and why
securing-cloud-and-supply-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 78 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
云原生与供应链安全
判断先于执行：决定「是否做 / 选什么 / 如何取舍」（栈、方案、架构、权衡）前，先读领域判断内核
skills/_kernel/security/SKILL.md——它管 judgment，本秘典管 execution；冲突时以内核判断为准。
默认怀疑一切外来字节：镜像、依赖、IaC 模块、CI runner、IAM trust。能签就签，能锁就锁，能最小就最小。
路由
| 意图 | 秘典 | 核心 |
|---|---|---|
| 容器/K8s 加固 | container-and-k8s | 容器逃逸、RBAC、PSS、NetworkPolicy、Service Mesh、Admission |
| 软件供应链 | supply-chain | SLSA、Sigstore、SBOM、CI/CD OIDC、attestation、VEX |
| 云 IAM 与 Secrets | cloud-iam-and-secrets | IAM 反模式、AssumeRole、Vault、KMS、IaC、Workload Identity |
何时使用
| 场景 | 用本 skill | 不用 |
|---|---|---|
| K8s manifest / Helm chart 安全审查 | ✅ | — |
| CI/CD pipeline (GitHub Actions / GitLab CI) 加固 | ✅ | — |
| Terraform / Pulumi / CloudFormation 评审 | ✅ | — |
| AWS/GCP/Azure IAM policy 审查 | ✅ | — |
| 镜像扫描与签名链路设计 | ✅ | — |
| 应用层 Web/API 漏洞 (SQLi/XSS/SSRF) | — | 用 securing-systems |
| 红队 C2/横移/免杀 | — | 用 securing-systems/red-team |
| 集群部署/Helm 模板编写 (非安全视角) | — | 用 provisioning-infrastructure |
| 一般架构设计与权衡 | — | 用 designing-architectures |
通用铁律
- Least privilege by default — 任何 Role/IAM/SA/Token 起手就是空集合，按需求逐项添加，禁通配
*与Action: *。 - Immutable infrastructure — 镜像用 digest 不用 tag，IaC state 不允许人工 drift，部署后只重建不改造。
- Sign everything, verify everywhere — 镜像、artifact、commit、SBOM 必须签名；准入控制必须 verify，否则等于没签。
- Secrets never in plaintext — 不进 git、不进 env file、不进 ConfigMap、不进 Terraform state；Vault/Secret Manager + 短期凭证。
- Defense in depth — 镜像扫描 + admission policy + runtime detection + network policy + audit log，单层失守不致命。
- OIDC over long-lived tokens — CI 到云、Pod 到云、Service 到 Service 一律 federated identity，废弃 access key。
- Provenance is non-negotiable — 不知道来源的二进制不上生产；SLSA L3+ 是目标线。
- Zero trust east-west — 内网即外网，mTLS 默认开启，NetworkPolicy 默认拒绝。
执行链
审查：清单 → 威胁建模 → 配置对照 → 风险分级 → 修复 PR → 验证回归
应急：定位失陷面 → 撤凭证 → 隔离工作负载 → 取证镜像 → 根因 → 加固准入
优先级红线
| 红线 | 立即处置 |
|---|---|
| Secrets 已进 git history | 撤销凭证 → rewrite history → 通报 |
| 公网暴露 K8s API server | 关闭 → IP 白名单 → 审计访问日志 |
| privileged: true Pod 跑业务 | 拒绝准入 → 重构镜像 → PSS restricted |
| CI 用 long-lived AWS key | 切 OIDC → 撤销 key → 审计旧密钥使用 |
Action: * IAM policy |
收敛权限 → CloudTrail 审计实际使用 |
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 78 lines · 85 tokens per session scan A 8b208e32d2b3
securing-cloud-and-supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository telagod/code-abyss (239 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 1,328 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
devops-specialist
DevOps 与运维专家。精通 CI/CD、容器化、编排、基础设施即代码、监控告警和自动化部署。用于构建高效、可靠的软件交付流水线和运维系统。.
audit-infra
Audit infrastructure — secrets, Docker, deps, CORS, webhooks, migrations, CI/CD, monitoring.
building-devsecops-pipeline-with-gitlab-ci
Design and implement a comprehensive DevSecOps pipeline in GitLab CI/CD integrating SAST, DAST, container scanning, dependency scanning, and secret detection.
supply-chain-security
Use for software supply-chain security assessment covering SBOM, SCA, CI/CD pipelines, container images, build integrity, dependency provenance, and vulnerability reachability.
devops-cicd
CI/CD and DevOps patterns: GitHub Actions workflows, Docker best practices, environment configuration, and deployment checklists. Use when configuring pipelines, containers, or deployments.
competition-agent-cloud
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for AI-agent, prompt-injection, MCP or toolchain, cloud, container, CI/CD, and supply-chain challenges. Use when the user asks to analyze prompt-to-tool flows, retrieval poisoning, mounted secrets, deployment drift, runtime-vs-manifest…