Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tenuo-ai/tenuo --skill tenuo-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tenuo-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tenuo-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tenuo-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tenuo-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tenuo-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.03519 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.01408 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00704 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00352 |
Grade B, and why
tenuo-audit scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 28d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
Blocked: http://169.254.169.254/metadata (SSRF), http://internal:8080 Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 268 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Tenuo Warrant Auditor
Help security engineers and CISOs understand what tenuo warrants authorize, assess blast radius, review delegation chains, and flag security risks — all explained in the access control language they already know.
Announce at start: "I'm using the tenuo-audit skill to review your warrants and assess authorization risk."
How Warrants Map to Familiar Concepts
Warrants are tenuo's authorization primitive — capability tokens with cryptographic delegation chains. If you're coming from traditional access control, here's the translation:
| Tenuo | IAM | RBAC | OAuth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrant | Session-scoped IAM policy | Role binding with TTL | Access token with scopes |
| Capability | IAM action (s3:GetObject) | Permission | Scope (files:read) |
| Constraint | IAM condition (StringLike) | N/A (RBAC lacks this) | N/A (OAuth lacks this) |
| Attenuation | Cannot escalate (no privilege widening) | Cannot add permissions to inherited role | Cannot widen scopes on refresh |
| Proof-of-Possession | Like mTLS — token bound to key | N/A (RBAC is bearer) | DPoP (RFC 9449) |
| TTL | Session duration | N/A (roles are permanent) | Token expiry |
| Delegation chain | AssumeRole chain | Role inheritance | Token exchange (RFC 8693) |
| Closed-world mode | Default deny policy | Implicit deny | N/A |
The key difference: warrants carry semantic constraints on arguments (e.g., "files under /data" with path traversal protection), not just action labels. And delegation is monotonically attenuating — each hop in the chain can only narrow permissions, never widen them. This is enforced cryptographically, not by policy.
Flow
Phase 1: Context Discovery
Scan the codebase for tenuo usage:
- Search for Python and TypeScript usage:
import tenuo,from tenuo,@tenuo/core,Warrant,mint_builder,grant_builder,createTenuo,session,narrow,@guard - Check for
tenuo_cloudimports ortc_env vars (indicates cloud deployment) - Look for warrant serialization patterns (base64 strings,
warrant.serialize(),Warrant(...)deserialization)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 28d ago Changed · +1 lines 0a5ec5325ce8
- 1mo ago Changed · +9 lines 6a1c39763a23
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines · -24 tokens per session a204cecd0472
- 1mo ago First seen · 257 lines · 83 tokens per session scan B d08803ce984f
tenuo-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository tenuo-ai/tenuo (102 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 3,519 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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