Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tenzro/tenzro-network --skill delegated-authoritygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tenzro/tenzro-networkWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenzro/tenzro-network/delegated-authority)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenzro/tenzro-network/delegated-authority"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tenzro/tenzro-network/delegated-authority/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tenzro/tenzro-network/delegated-authority"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tenzro/tenzro-network/delegated-authority.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.01132 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.00453 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00226 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00113 |
Grade A, and why
delegated-authority scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 130 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Delegated Authority Skill
MCP Endpoint
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Server | Tenzro L1 core MCP server |
| Testnet endpoint | https://mcp.tenzro.xyz/mcp |
| Local endpoint | http://localhost:3001/mcp |
| Tool | authorize_tool_call |
| Underlying RPC | tenzro_authorizeToolCall |
What this is for
Before running a tool that changes something — an edit, a shell command, a transfer, a contract call — ask whether you are allowed to.
The answer does not come from local configuration. It comes from the delegation grant your controller signed: which parties you may act as, which templates and commands you may use, what you may spend per call, and which actions their oversight claim requires a human to approve.
This matters because a policy held in a config file cannot constrain the process running you — anything able to edit that file can remove the gate. A grant is signed, lives on the network, and answers the same way whether you are running inside a coding harness or autonomously.
When to call it
Call it when the tool would change state or spend:
- writing or deleting files outside a scratch directory
- shell commands with side effects
- any transfer, contract call, or paid resource invocation
- anything acting on behalf of a party you were delegated
Do not call it before reads, searches, or listing operations. A gate on every read makes the check noise and trains you to ignore it.
The three answers
authorize_tool_call(tool="edit_file")
→ {"decision": "permit", "tool": "edit_file", "resource_id": "tool:edit_file", "wallet_id": "..."}
permit — proceed.
require_approval — a human must approve first. This is an outcome, not a
failure. Do not retry, do not route around it, and do not report it as an
error. Surface the approval_id to the human, stop that line of work, and
continue with something else if there is something else to do.
→ {"decision": "require_approval", "approval_id": "apr_...", "reason": "..."}
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 130 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A a4b1e59222d6
delegated-authority is a skill published in the GitHub repository tenzro/tenzro-network (3 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 1,132 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-13.
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