prompt-injection

prompt-injection is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from thejefflarson/soundcheck. It costs 68 tokens per session (713 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security check for AI prompts that include user text, retrieved documents, emails, web pages, or tool results. Prompt injection is an attack where outside text tricks the AI into ignoring its intended instructions.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when building prompts from external or user-controlled content, retrieval systems, or applications that act on model responses.
Why use it?
It helps prevent attackers from changing the model's behavior, exposing data, bypassing safeguards, or triggering unwanted actions.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Part of the soundcheck plugin — 52 skills, 7 agents, 2 hooks shipped together

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/prompt-injection
Any agent
npx skills add thejefflarson/soundcheck --skill prompt-injection
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Or install soundcheck, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 52 skills, 7 agents, 2 hooks.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for prompt-injection

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/prompt-injection.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/prompt-injection)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/prompt-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/prompt-injection.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 68 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 713 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00068 $0.00713
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.00357
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00143
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00071

Measured 4d ago against content hash 75561052d70e, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

prompt-injection scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/prompt-injection/SKILL.md · 62 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 62 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Prompt Injection Security Check (OWASP LLM01:2025)

What this checks

Protects against attacker-controlled text that hijacks LLM instructions. Direct injection arrives through user input; indirect injection arrives through retrieved documents, emails, or tool outputs. Both can cause the model to exfiltrate data, bypass guardrails, or execute unintended actions.

Vulnerable patterns

  • User input interpolated directly into the system-role message — user text lands in the instruction tier.
  • Retrieved documents concatenated raw into the prompt with no delimiter or trust label.
  • Email bodies, fetched web pages, or other external content passed into the prompt with no boundary markers separating data from instructions.
  • No structural separation between developer instructions and untrusted data — everything is one string.
  • Raw model response returned to the caller, rendered, logged, or used to trigger a downstream action with no validation step in between.

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Then suggest a fix that establishes these properties. Translate each property into the audited file's language and LLM client library — use that library's documented role-separated message API rather than mirroring an example from another stack.

  1. Trust tiers are structurally separate. Developer instructions go in the system role; user input and retrieved documents go in the user role, wrapped in explicit delimiter tags that label the content as untrusted data. Never interpolate user text into the system prompt.
  2. Input is bounded and screened before the API call. Apply a length cap and reject obvious injection markers (phrases like "ignore previous", "new instruction"). Screening is a denylist and will not catch everything, but it raises the bar.
  3. Output is validated before any downstream action. Every code path that uses the model's response — returning it to the caller, rendering it, logging it, triggering a tool call — first routes it through a gate that enforces size bounds and rejects suspicious instruction language. A defined validator that is never called does not satisfy this.

Read the full file on GitHub · 62 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 4d ago First seen · 62 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A 75561052d70e

Subscribe to this mod's changes

prompt-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository thejefflarson/soundcheck (20 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 713 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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