Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add thkt/dotclaude --skill use-context-reviewer-readabilitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thkt/dotclaudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/thkt/dotclaude/use-context-reviewer-readability)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/thkt/dotclaude/use-context-reviewer-readability"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/thkt/dotclaude/use-context-reviewer-readability/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/thkt/dotclaude/use-context-reviewer-readability"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/thkt/dotclaude/use-context-reviewer-readability.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.00763 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00305 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00153 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00076 |
Grade A, and why
use-context-reviewer-readability scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
use-context-reviewer-readability
しきい値は、作業記憶や 1 画面集中といった認知限界と、McCabe complexity のような確立されたメトリクスに基づく。下表は推奨値で、検出表はそれを超えた全件でなく報告に値する逸脱だけを挙げる。関数引数の推奨は 3、検出は 5 超。
| 目標 | 推奨値 | 根拠 |
|---|---|---|
| 関数行数 | ≤30 | 1 画面の可読性 |
| ファイル行数 | ≤400 | モジュールレベルの認知上限 |
| ネスト深度 | ≤3 | 作業記憶内での分岐追跡 |
| 関数引数 | ≤3 | 引数順の暗記限界 |
| 循環的複雑度 | ≤10 | McCabe 1976: パス爆発なくテスト可能 |
検出
| ID | パターン | 修正 |
|---|---|---|
| RD1 | 曖昧な processData() |
validateUserEmail() |
| RD1 | 誤解を招く識別子 | 名前は意図を表す |
| RD2 | ネスト > 3 階層 | guard clause、関数抽出 |
| RD2 | 関数 > 30 行 | 分解 |
| RD3 | コメント: // increment i |
自明なので削除 |
| RD3 | コメント: // TODO: fix later |
issue 化または今修正 |
| RD4 | 単一実装の interface | 2 つ目の実装が出るまで削除 |
| RD4 | 状態を持たないロジックの class | 純粋関数 |
| RD5 | 関数引数 > 5 | 設定オブジェクトまたは分解 |
参照ファイル
| トピック | ファイル |
|---|---|
| Control Flow | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/control-flow.md |
| Comments | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/comments-clarity.md |
| AI Antipatterns | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/ai-antipatterns.md |
| Naming | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/naming.md |
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 45 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 69f9420bebc3
use-context-reviewer-readability is a skill published in the GitHub repository thkt/dotclaude (12 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 763 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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