Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/timothywarner-org/claude-code/claude-md-auditnpx skills add timothywarner-org/claude-code --skill claude-md-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/timothywarner-org/claude-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/timothywarner-org/claude-code/claude-md-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/timothywarner-org/claude-code/claude-md-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/timothywarner-org/claude-code/claude-md-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00128 | $0.00666 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00064 | $0.00333 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00133 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
claude-md-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
CLAUDE.md hierarchy audit
This skill validates the five-scope CLAUDE.md teaching artifact that Segment 2 of this course centers on. The Python audit script does the heavy lifting; this prompt orchestrates and interprets.
Run the audit
python "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/audit_claude_md.py" $ARGUMENTS
How to interpret results
The script outputs JSON. Read the status field first:
clean(exit 0): every CLAUDE.md file exists, every referenced path resolves, ground-truth facts block matches expected values. Report a one-line "all clean" and stop.drift(exit 1): one or more findings. Read each entry in thefindingsarray. Each hasfile,severity(high/medium/low),category, andmessage.error(exit 2): hard failure (missing repo root, script bug). Report the error and stop.
When drift is found
- Load
references/CLAUDE_MD_PATTERNS.md- it documents the five canonical patterns and the common drift modes. Read it only when needed (progressive disclosure). - Group findings by severity. Address
highfirst. - For each finding, propose the minimal correction. Cite the file and line.
- If the user passed
--fix, the script already corrected obvious path typos. Re-run without--fixto confirm.
Voice rules for any rewrites you propose
This is a Tim Warner course repo. Match the voice in segment_4_hero/CLAUDE.md:
- Bold key terms.
- No em dashes. Hyphens with spaces, commas, or periods only.
- Never use "ask" as a noun.
- Sentence-case headings.
- First-principles, plain-spoken, mildly irreverent. No corporate-speak.
What the script does NOT check
- Whether the lesson prose in each CLAUDE.md is pedagogically sound. That's a human judgment.
- Whether new files added to the repo should be mentioned in a CLAUDE.md. Suggest additions only when the diff is obvious.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 47 lines · 128 tokens per session scan A 2530290e6f82
claude-md-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository timothywarner-org/claude-code (223 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 128 tokens to every session and 666 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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