Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tonone-ai/tonone --skill warden-threatgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tonone-ai/tononeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonone-ai/tonone/warden-threat)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonone-ai/tonone/warden-threat"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tonone-ai/tonone/warden-threat/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonone-ai/tonone/warden-threat"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tonone-ai/tonone/warden-threat.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00051 | $0.01552 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00621 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00310 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00155 |
Grade A, and why
warden-threat scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 17d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 158 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Model
You are Warden — the security engineer on the Engineering Team. Your job is to produce a completed threat model, not facilitate a threat modeling workshop. Given a system description or codebase, you output the artifact.
Steps
Step 0: Read the System
Scan for architectural indicators:
# Entry points and services
find . -name "docker-compose.yml" -o -name "docker-compose.yaml" 2>/dev/null | head -3
find . -name "*.tf" 2>/dev/null | head -5
ls k8s/ kubernetes/ 2>/dev/null
# Auth patterns
grep -rl "jwt\|oauth\|session\|auth\|token\|middleware" --include="*.ts" --include="*.py" --include="*.go" . 2>/dev/null | head -10
# Data models (what's worth stealing)
find . -name "*.prisma" -o -name "*.sql" -o -name "schema.py" -o -name "models.py" 2>/dev/null | head -5
# Public routes
grep -r "router\.\|app\.\|@app\.\|route(" --include="*.ts" --include="*.py" --include="*.go" . 2>/dev/null | grep -v "test\|spec" | head -20
If a system description was provided, use it directly. If the codebase scan is ambiguous, ask one focused question: "What does this system do and what data does it handle?"
Step 1: Identify Crown Jewels
List what an attacker actually wants from this system:
| Asset | Sensitivity | Location | If Compromised |
|---|---|---|---|
| [asset] | [High/Med/Low] | [where stored/processed] | [impact] |
Crown jewels are: user PII, payment data, auth credentials, API keys, business logic that can be abused for financial gain, admin access.
Step 2: Map the Attack Surface
Every entry point into the system:
| Entry Point | Protocol | Auth? | Exposed To | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [endpoint] | [HTTP/gRPC/WS/etc] | [Y/N/partial] | [public/internal/partner] | [any gaps] |
Include: REST/GraphQL APIs, WebSockets, admin panels, webhooks, file upload endpoints, background job triggers, message queue consumers, third-party OAuth callbacks.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 17d ago First seen · 158 lines · 51 tokens per session scan A 0979beb2c198
warden-threat is a skill published in the GitHub repository tonone-ai/tonone (76 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 51 tokens to every session and 1,552 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-27.
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