Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/transilienceai/communitytools/server-sidenpx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill server-sidegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytoolsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/server-side)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/server-side"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/transilienceai/communitytools/server-side.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00492 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00246 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00098 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00049 |
Grade A, and why
server-side scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Server-Side
Test for server-side vulnerabilities that allow unauthorized access, RCE, or data exfiltration.
Techniques
| Type | Key Vectors |
|---|---|
| SSRF | Internal service access, cloud metadata, protocol smuggling |
| HTTP Smuggling | CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, CL.0, H2.CL, h2c, multi-layer proxy chains, connection pooling desync |
| Path Traversal | Directory traversal, null bytes, encoding bypass |
| File Upload | Extension bypass, content-type manipulation, polyglot files |
| Deserialization | Java, PHP, Python, .NET gadget chains |
| Host Header | Password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, routing-based SSRF |
| CUPS / cups-browsed | CVE-2024-47076/47175/47176/47177 — UDP browse → IPP injection → PPD injection → foomatic-rip RCE (see skills/infrastructure/reference/scenarios/network-recon/cups-browsed-rce.md) |
Workflow
- Identify server-side processing points
- Test for vulnerability class indicators
- Bypass protections (WAF, allowlists, encoding filters)
- Demonstrate impact (file read, RCE, internal access)
- Capture evidence with PoC
Reference
reference/scenarios/ssrf/*.md- SSRF techniques and labsreference/http-request-smuggling*.md- Smuggling techniquesreference/scenarios/path-traversal/*.md- Path traversal bypass methodsreference/file-upload*.md- File upload exploitationreference/insecure-deserialization*.md- Deserialization attacksreference/http-host-header*.md- Host header injectionskills/infrastructure/reference/scenarios/network-recon/cups-browsed-rce.md- CUPS RCE chain (CVE-2024-47076/175/176/177); ipptool false positives vs libcups runtime parser; ippserver Python lib version-1.1 hardcode bug
What ships with it
49 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- reference/file-upload-resources.md 5.3 KB
- reference/http-host-header-resources.md 4.9 KB
- reference/http-request-smuggling-resources.md 4.8 KB
- reference/INDEX.md 6.2 KB
- reference/insecure-deserialization-resources.md 7.1 KB
- reference/protocol-coercion.md 4.5 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/dotnet-deserialization.md 11 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/java-deserialization.md 7.2 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/nodejs-deserialization.md 5.7 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/php-deserialization.md 6.1 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/python-and-ruby.md 5.7 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/react-server-components-flight.md 6.6 KB
- reference/scenarios/deserialization/tools/aspnet_viewstate_build.py 3.4 KB runs code
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/content-type-and-magic-bytes.md 3.4 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/defense-evasion-and-yara.md 5.1 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/extension-bypass.md 3.6 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/ntfs-junction-write-redirect.md 6.4 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/ntlm-hash-leak-via-media-upload.md 5.3 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/path-traversal-and-htaccess.md 7.6 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/polyglot-and-metadata-injection.md 7.2 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/python-module-shadowing-via-so.md 7.2 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/race-conditions.md 5.2 KB
- reference/scenarios/file-upload/web-shell-payloads.md 6.3 KB
- reference/scenarios/host-header/auth-bypass-localhost.md 3.3 KB
- reference/scenarios/host-header/cache-poisoning-via-host.md 3.0 KB
- reference/scenarios/host-header/password-reset-poisoning.md 2.8 KB
- reference/scenarios/host-header/routing-ssrf-and-flawed-parsing.md 4.6 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/cl-te.md 4.9 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/cl-zero-and-pause-based.md 2.4 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/exploitation-patterns.md 3.8 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/h2-downgrade.md 3.5 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/te-cl.md 1.9 KB
- reference/scenarios/http-smuggling/te-te-obfuscation.md 2.3 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/basic-payloads-and-encoding.md 4.5 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/filter-bypass-techniques.md 9.1 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/lfi-to-rce.md 10 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/nbconvert-jupyter-notebook.md 7.2 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/platform-specific.md 7.0 KB
- reference/scenarios/path-traversal/target-files.md 7.4 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/blind-detection-and-portscan.md 4.3 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/cloud-metadata.md 5.5 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/localhost-and-ip-bypass.md 5.9 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/protocol-exploitation-gopher.md 6.1 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/proxy-path-traversal.md 2.9 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/redis-inline-via-header-name.md 7.0 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/stored-connector-url-ssrf.md 7.5 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/url-parser-and-allowlist-bypass.md 3.1 KB
- reference/scenarios/ssrf/utf8-binary-loss-limit.md 8.0 KB
- reference/server-side-principles.md 6.6 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 39 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A e93a6032bc4a
server-side is a skill published in the GitHub repository transilienceai/communitytools (507 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 492 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
pentester-playwright
Phases 1b/3/4 authorized browser automation — SPA recon, multi-role auth, route/API catalog, PoC screenshots, Evidence landing (scoped proxy). Skill-gate read for web phases. Use when Phase 1b/3/4 web work, JS-rendered SPA, real browser needed, HAR/network capture, or Playwright PoC evidence.
osint-recon
Phase 1 conditional OSINT depth — four-dimension model (server→site→domain→people; people is conditional). Skill-gate companion to pentester-enum-services / pentester-recon. Use for passive OSINT depth, full recon dimensions, author tracking, not as Phase 0/Schema replacement.
pentester-exploit
Phase 4 exploitation — PoC construction, exploit-db/msf search, safe verification. Required Skill-gate read at Phase 4. Use when starting Phase 4, exploitation, exploit, PoC, exploit-db, msf, Metasploit, or payload delivery.
pentester-recon
Phase 1 intelligence recon methodology — passive+active recon, stack fingerprint, attack-surface map. Required Skill-gate read at Phase 1 (with pentester-enum-services). Use when starting Phase 1, intelligence gathering, recon, reconnaissance, OSINT prep, target profiling, or attack surface mapping.
pentester-toolkit
Provision the pinned pentest toolset via DotSlash for the current scanenv (host-kali or kali-target-${ID}). Adapter, not a tool wrapper.
pentester-waf-bypass
Phase 4 conditional — WAF/filter bypass for authorized CTF/range/pentest when payloads are blocked. Use at Phase 4 if blocked, or when user mentions WAF bypass, filter evasion, SQL/XSS/command-injection bypass, or security filter analysis.