Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00184 | $0.02120 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00074 | $0.00848 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00037 | $0.00424 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00212 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 142 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Android intent redirection and PendingIntent: when an app relays an attacker's intent
An Android app acts on intents, and two patterns let an untrusted caller borrow the app's privilege. In intent redirection, a component receives an intent that carries another intent inside it and then launches that nested intent; if the component is reachable by other apps and forwards the nested intent without constraint, an untrusted caller supplies an intent aimed at a protected component the caller could not reach directly, and the privileged app launches it with the app's own identity. In the pending-intent case, the app creates a token that lets another app perform an operation as the app later; if that token is mutable and under-specified, the other app fills in the missing parts, target, action, or data, and directs the operation where it wants, still under the app's identity. In both, the app relays an attacker's intent and lends its privilege to the destination. The bug is a privileged component launching or sending an intent an untrusted caller controls. You audit these by finding every forwarded and shared intent and checking what the caller can steer.
When to use
- An Android app forwards an intent it extracts from a received intent's extras or data.
- The app creates pending intents shared with other apps or delivered implicitly.
- A reachable component launches or sends intents on behalf of its caller.
Scope check
Audit intent redirection only on apps and devices you own or are authorized to assess, on test devices and accounts, driving the component with a benign test app you control rather than acting against real data. A confirmed redirection reaches protected components with the app's privilege, so keep every probe within scope. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish whether the caller can actually steer the launched or sent intent first. For each component that forwards a nested intent or shares a pending intent, determine whether the target and contents are fixed by the app, or whether an untrusted caller can supply or fill in the intent that is ultimately launched or sent. This is the false-positive killer: a component that launches only a fully specified, app-fixed intent, or a pending intent that is immutable and complete, cannot be steered by an attacker. Name the attacker-controlled part before crafting an intent.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 142 lines · 184 tokens per session scan A b94af3580f9b
auditing-android-intent-redirection-and-pendingintent is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 184 tokens to every session and 2,120 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-09.
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