Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-cicd-oidc-trustgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-cicd-oidc-trust)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-cicd-oidc-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-cicd-oidc-trust/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-cicd-oidc-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-cicd-oidc-trust.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00137 | $0.01615 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00068 | $0.00807 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00323 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00161 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-cicd-oidc-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing CI/CD OIDC trust: the pipeline is an identity, treat its inputs as hostile
A modern pipeline is a privileged identity. It holds secrets, and it presents a short-lived token that a cloud account trusts and exchanges for real credentials. The danger is that the same pipeline also runs code and content that outsiders can influence: a change request from a fork, a dependency, a script in the repository. When untrusted input reaches a privileged step, or when the cloud trusts the pipeline's token too broadly, an outsider borrows the pipeline's identity. The audit is about where untrusted input meets pipeline privilege.
When to use
- You are reviewing CI/CD workflows, their triggers, and their secret and token access.
- A pipeline exchanges a short-lived identity token for cloud credentials.
- Any workflow runs on input from forks or external contributors.
Scope check
Review pipeline configuration in repositories and accounts you own or are authorized to test. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Inventory triggers and what each run can reach. For every workflow, record what event starts it, whether that event can be caused by an outside contributor, and what the run holds: repository secrets, an identity token, write permission to the repository or a registry. A run that both accepts outside input and holds privilege is the shape to chase.
-
Find fork-triggered runs that keep secrets. A workflow that runs on an incoming change from a fork and still receives repository secrets or a privileged token hands those to code the outsider proposed. Confirm which triggers expose secrets on untrusted content, rather than assuming the default is safe.
-
Trace untrusted input to a privileged step. Follow attacker-influenced content, a change-request title, a branch name, a file in the fork, a dependency script, into any step that runs a command, publishes an artifact, or requests cloud credentials. Content that reaches a shell or a publish step is poisoned-pipeline execution.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 134 lines · 137 tokens per session scan A 00e8ca207105
auditing-cicd-oidc-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 137 tokens to every session and 1,615 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
terraform-skill
Terraform infrastructure as code best practices.
ci-cd
GitHub Actions, required checks, TestMu, OS matrix, and merge gates for Skill Doctor. Use when editing workflows, adding CI jobs, deciding what runs on every commit, or wiring crates/npm publish.
cloud-security-engineer
Cloud Security Engineer role bundle for cloud security posture management, IaC review, container security, and identity governance across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Orchestrates cloud-specific posture reviews and zero trust program assessments. Auto-invoked when the user needs help with cloud security configuration, IaC…
security-engineer
Security Engineer role bundle for building security into products and infrastructure. Orchestrates code review, pipeline hardening, vulnerability response, and infrastructure review workflows. Auto-invoked when the user needs help with secure development practices, CI/CD security, vulnerability management, or…
azure-review
Performs an Azure security posture review against the CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v2.1.0. Auto-invoked when reviewing Azure infrastructure, Entra ID configurations, NSG rules, Defender for Cloud settings, or Key Vault access policies. Walks through all nine benchmark sections, evaluates each…
gcp-review
Performs a GCP security posture review against the CIS Google Cloud Platform Foundation Benchmark v2.0.0. Auto-invoked when reviewing GCP infrastructure, IAM bindings, VPC firewall rules, Cloud Audit Logs, or GCS bucket security. Walks through all seven benchmark sections, evaluates each recommendation, and produces a…