Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-container-image-provenancegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-image-provenance)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-image-provenance"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-image-provenance/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-image-provenance"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-image-provenance.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00155 | $0.01898 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00077 | $0.00949 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00031 | $0.00380 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-container-image-provenance scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing container image provenance: when the tag is not the artifact
The image a workload runs is the code it runs, and a container reference is only a promise about which bytes those are. A mutable tag can point at different content over time, so a workload pinned to a tag runs whatever that tag resolves to at pull time, not the artifact that was reviewed. Signing and provenance attestation exist to close that gap, but only if they are enforced at admission rather than merely produced in the pipeline: a signature nobody verifies is decoration, and an attestation the cluster does not require proves nothing to the cluster. The failure is quiet because the workload starts and runs; the question is whether what it runs is provably the artifact you intended. You audit this by tracing each workload's image reference back to a verified digest and confirming the cluster refuses anything unproven.
When to use
- Workloads reference images by mutable tags rather than immutable content digests.
- Image signing or provenance attestation is produced but may not be enforced at admission.
- Images are pulled from registries or base images whose origin the pipeline does not verify.
Scope check
Audit image provenance only for clusters, registries, and pipelines you own or are authorized to assess. A confirming test may push a benign image or retag one in a registry you control, so stay inside the authorized registry and remove any test artifact. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish the intended artifact and its proof first. Name, for each workload, exactly which image it is supposed to run and how that is proven: a content digest, a signature by a trusted key, a provenance attestation. This is the false-positive killer: a workload pinned to a digest whose signature and provenance the cluster verifies at admission is running a proven artifact. Name the intended proof, then check whether the reference and enforcement provide it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 135 lines · 155 tokens per session scan A ac7773da9796
auditing-container-image-provenance is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 155 tokens to every session and 1,898 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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