Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00161 | $0.01948 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00081 | $0.00974 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00390 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00195 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing container runtime and socket exposure: a handle on the runtime is a handle on the host
Access to the container runtime is access to the host, full stop. Whoever can talk to the runtime socket or API can start a new container that is privileged, mounts the host root filesystem, and shares the host namespaces, and from there they own the node. So mounting the runtime socket into a pod, or binding it into a build or CI container, is not a convenience; it is handing that workload the ability to escape to the host by design, no kernel bug required. The pattern shows up wherever tooling genuinely needs the runtime, image builds, node agents, CI that builds containers, and the mistake is granting broad runtime access for a narrow need. The audit is direct: find every workload that can reach the runtime and treat that reach as host control unless it is tightly brokered. You audit this by locating runtime-socket mounts and runtime-API reachability and confirming nothing untrusted holds them.
When to use
- A workload, build container, or agent is given the container runtime socket or access to the runtime API.
- A sidecar or tool talks to the runtime to build, launch, or inspect containers.
- The runtime API may be exposed over a reachable port rather than a local, access-controlled socket.
Scope check
Audit runtime exposure only on hosts and clusters you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production nodes. Demonstrating runtime access can launch a container that controls the host, so use a non-production node and stop at proof rather than taking over the node. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish which workloads legitimately need the runtime first. Name the workloads that genuinely must talk to the runtime and exactly what operation each needs. This is the false-positive killer: a workload that needs no runtime access and is given none is fine, and one that needs a narrow operation brokered through a constrained intermediary is far better than a raw socket. Name the legitimate need, then find raw or broad runtime access.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 135 lines · 161 tokens per session scan A 092bd3301fcd
auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 161 tokens to every session and 1,948 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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