Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-declared-vs-used-permissionsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00128 | $0.01540 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00064 | $0.00770 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00308 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00154 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 127 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing declared versus used permissions: the consent gap is the bug
A user grants a skill the permissions it asks for. The question no one checks is whether it needs them. A skill that requests shell access and never shells out, or network access and never makes a call, has widened the user's blast radius for nothing, and a compromise or a later update inherits that headroom. Worse is the other direction: a skill that acts beyond what it declared. This skill measures the gap between the grant and the use, in both directions.
When to use
- You are reviewing a skill, an MCP server, or a marketplace entry before install.
- You are auditing least privilege across an agent's installed skills and tools.
- You want to right-size a grant, not just confirm the artifact runs.
Scope check
Audit skills and servers you own or are authorized to review. Inspect the bundled code statically; run it only in a contained environment. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Read the declared permission surface. Collect exactly what the artifact asks for: the allowed-tools or capability list in frontmatter or manifest, the scopes it requests, the network, filesystem, and process access it declares. This is the consent the user is asked to give. Record it as the grant set.
-
Inventory what the code and instructions actually exercise. Walk the bundled scripts and the instruction text and record the real capabilities used: which tools are invoked, whether it spawns a process, opens a socket, reads outside its own directory, or reaches the network. Prefer tracing the flow over a string grep, so an aliased or indirect call is not missed. This is the use set.
-
Diff for over-grants: declared but never used. Subtract use from grant. Every capability requested and never exercised is an over-grant: pure headroom the user consented to for no delivered function. This is the common consent gap and the easiest least-privilege win.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 127 lines · 128 tokens per session scan A e22e35b71edd
auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 128 tokens to every session and 1,540 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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