Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00169 | $0.02045 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00084 | $0.01022 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00409 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00204 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing host mount and device exposure: a path into the node filesystem
A hostPath volume or a device mount is a hole cut in the container boundary: it connects the workload directly to the node's filesystem or hardware. Sometimes that is genuinely needed, a node agent reading a specific system directory, but the exposure is defined by what the mount reaches, not by why it was added. A writable hostPath into a sensitive node directory lets the workload alter node state; a mount of the host root or a broad system path exposes other pods' data, node configuration, and credentials; a raw device or block volume grants low-level access that bypasses filesystem controls; and a hostPath with loose subpath or symlink handling can be walked out of its intended directory into the rest of the node. The audit treats each host mount as node reach and asks how far it goes. You audit this by inventorying every host-path and device mount and determining exactly what node state each exposes and whether it is writable.
When to use
- Workloads mount hostPath volumes or devices that connect the container to the node filesystem or hardware.
- A mount may reach a sensitive node directory, the host root, or a raw device broader than the workload needs.
- A hostPath's subpath or symlink handling may let a workload escape the intended directory into the node.
Scope check
Audit host mounts only on clusters and nodes you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production nodes. Confirming a mount's reach reads or writes real node state and can affect other pods, so use a non-production node and do not alter node state or read other pods' real data. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish the workload's legitimate host need first. Name exactly which node path or device each workload genuinely needs and whether it needs to write. This is the false-positive killer: a workload with no host mount, or one with a narrow read-only mount of exactly the directory it needs, is correctly bounded. Name the legitimate need, then compare each mount to it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 134 lines · 169 tokens per session scan A 1c7add0125c3
auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 169 tokens to every session and 2,045 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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