Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trustgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00180 | $0.02078 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00090 | $0.01039 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00416 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00208 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 138 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing init and sidecar injection trust: the containers you did not write share your pod
A pod is not just its application container. Init containers run first, sidecars run alongside, and many are injected automatically by a mutating admission webhook that the workload owner never sees in their manifest. All of them share the pod: the same network namespace, often shared volumes, sometimes the process namespace, and they can be granted their own security context and credentials. That makes every init and sidecar container a trust question the main container did not ask. An injected sidecar may run privileged or with host access the app never needed; an init container may fetch and execute remote content before the app starts; a shared secret volume or process namespace lets a sidecar read the application's secrets; and the injected image and its configuration may come from a source outside the workload owner's control. The pod looks like one workload but is a collection of containers with different privileges and origins. You audit this by enumerating every init and sidecar container, declared and injected, and checking what trust each holds.
When to use
- Pods run init or sidecar containers, especially ones injected by a mutating admission webhook.
- An injected or auxiliary container may run with broader privilege, host access, or credentials than the app.
- Init containers fetch or execute content, or sidecars share volumes or namespaces with the main container.
Scope check
Audit init and sidecar trust only on clusters and workloads you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production pods. Confirming a sidecar can read the app's secrets or that an init container executes remote content touches real workloads, so use non-production pods and do not exfiltrate anything you surface. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish the workload's intended trust first. Name what the application container is supposed to run with: its privilege level, its credentials, its host access. This is the false-positive killer: a pod whose init and sidecar containers run at or below the app's privilege, from controlled images, sharing nothing sensitive, is fine. Name the intended trust, then check each auxiliary container against it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 138 lines · 180 tokens per session scan A 3a2cd87dca73
auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 180 tokens to every session and 2,078 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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