Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trustgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00185 | $0.02109 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00093 | $0.01055 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00422 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00211 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing JWT verification and key trust: the token names its own signer unless you stop it
A JSON Web Token is a signed claim, and its security is entirely in how the verifier checks the signature and the claims. The failures are a small, famous set, and they recur because the token itself carries the parameters an attacker wants to control. The algorithm lives in the token header, so a verifier that trusts it can be steered into algorithm confusion, verifying an RS256 token as HS256 using the public key as the shared secret, or accepting an algorithm of none with no signature at all. The key can be selected from the header too, a key id, a JWKS URL, or an embedded key, so a token can name a signer the attacker controls. A verifier that decodes the token and reads the claims but never actually checks the signature accepts anything. And a verifier that checks the signature but not the expiry, issuer, and audience honors expired or wrong-context tokens. The audit pins the algorithm and key on the server side and confirms the signature and claims are enforced. You audit this by presenting manipulated tokens and confirming each is refused.
When to use
- A service accepts JWTs and verifies them to authenticate or authorize a caller.
- The signing algorithm or key may be chosen from token-supplied fields (alg, kid, jku, embedded key).
- Claims such as expiry, issuer, and audience may be parsed but not enforced during verification.
Scope check
Test JWT verification only against services you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production tokens and accounts. Forging tokens attempts real authentication, so use non-production credentials and never use a forged token to reach real data. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish the intended algorithm and key first. Name the exact algorithm the service should accept and the specific key or key set it should verify against, both fixed on the server side. This is the false-positive killer: a verifier that pins the algorithm, selects the key from server configuration or a pinned trusted key set, verifies the signature, and enforces expiry, issuer, and audience is correct. Name the intended algorithm and key, then test manipulation.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 135 lines · 185 tokens per session scan A 8858cbd9eb13
auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 185 tokens to every session and 2,109 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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