Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00178 | $0.01999 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00089 | $0.01000 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00400 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00200 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Kubernetes workload and RBAC hardening: what the binding graph and admission actually allow
A wildcard ClusterRole that nothing binds grants nobody anything, and a privileged pod that admission rejects never deploys. That is why this audit is not a scan of role verbs and pod fields; it is a resolution of the binding graph (which subject is actually granted a role) and the admission layer (whether the workload can deploy as written). The competitors flag a wildcard role or a root container in isolation; the finding that survives is the one where a binding grants the power to a workload that can use it, and admission does not stop it. You audit the manifests by resolving those two layers and asking, per subject and per workload, whether it holds more than it needs and can act on it. Stay on the Kubernetes YAML plane, not the cloud IAM graph and not the image build.
When to use
- You have Kubernetes manifests: roles and bindings, pod and workload specs, service accounts, network policies.
- A binding references cluster-admin or a wildcard role, or a pod sets a privileged or host-level security context.
- You want to know which grants and privileges the binding graph and admission actually allow, not which appear.
Scope check
Audit only manifests for clusters you own or are authorized to assess, and never apply a manifest or exercise a binding against a live cluster to test a finding, adjudicate on the resolved graph. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Resolve the binding graph and admission first. For each Role and ClusterRole, find the bindings that reference it and the subjects they grant it to (a named service account, a broad group, an authenticated-users binding), and determine what pod-security admission level or admission policy the target namespace enforces. A role is only a grant through a binding, and a workload is only deployable if admission allows it; settle both before flagging.
-
Check over-granted bindings. Look for a RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding to cluster-admin, or to a role with wildcard verbs, resources, or API groups, and note how broad the bound subject is. A wildcard role bound to a default service account that pods mount is far worse than one bound to nothing.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 133 lines · 178 tokens per session scan A d89ab5c67607
auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 178 tokens to every session and 1,999 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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