Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00186 | $0.02124 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00074 | $0.00850 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00037 | $0.00425 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00212 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 139 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing mobile WebView bridge exposure: when a web page calls into the native app
A mobile app that embeds a WebView often gives the web content a way to call back into native code: a bridge that exposes native methods to JavaScript so the page can use the camera, read files, fetch tokens, or drive app features. That bridge is safe only when the content on the other side is trusted and confined, content the app authored, loaded from an origin it controls, over a channel that cannot be tampered with. It becomes an exposure when untrusted content reaches the bridge: a remote page the app loads, a third-party frame inside it, a link the WebView follows to an attacker origin, or content injected over an insecure channel. Then web script the app did not author invokes native methods and acts with the app's privileges. The bug is a native capability reachable from web content the app does not fully trust, whether because the bridge is exposed to untrusted origins, the WebView loads content it should not, or the bridge methods trust any caller. You audit these by tracing which content can reach the bridge and what each exposed method does.
When to use
- A native app embeds a WebView that exposes a native interface or message handler to JavaScript.
- The WebView loads remote content, third-party frames, or follows links to origins the app does not control.
- Bridge methods perform privileged actions or return app data without checking the calling origin.
Scope check
Audit WebView bridges only on apps you own or are authorized to assess, on test devices and accounts, driving the bridge with benign content you control rather than acting against real data. A confirmed exposure lets web content wield native privilege, so keep every probe within scope. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish which content can actually reach the bridge and whether the methods check the caller first. For each exposed native interface, determine whether only trusted, app-authored content loaded from a controlled origin over a secure channel can reach it, or whether remote content, a third-party frame, a followed link, or injected content can, and whether each bridge method verifies the calling origin. This is the false-positive killer: a bridge reachable only by trusted confined content, or one whose methods authorize the caller, is not driven by an attacker even though it exposes native capability. Name the untrusted content path before crafting a call.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 139 lines · 186 tokens per session scan A bca891a7caf1
auditing-mobile-webview-bridge-exposure is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 186 tokens to every session and 2,124 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-09.
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