Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-move-resource-ownershipgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-move-resource-ownership)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-move-resource-ownership"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-move-resource-ownership/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-move-resource-ownership"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-move-resource-ownership.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00197 | $0.02058 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00098 | $0.01029 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00412 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00206 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-move-resource-ownership scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Move resource ownership: acting on a resource without proving the caller owns it
Move's safety rests on linear resources and abilities, and the bug is a function that acts on a resource or an object without proving the caller is entitled to it. A public entry function with no signer-authority check, an object passed in and mutated without verifying its owner, a capability resource that leaks because it can be stored or returned, an ability granted too broadly, these are the ways an arbitrary signer reaches a privileged state change. You audit it by resolving each function's visibility (who can call it) and the ability set of the types it touches (what can be copied, stored, or dropped), then checking whether the function asserts ownership or authority before it acts. The account-model and reentrancy shapes belong to the EVM smart-contract skills; this skill owns the resource-and-ability model of Move.
When to use
- You are reviewing a Move module's functions, their visibility, and the resources and objects they touch.
- A public or entry function acts on a passed object or a global resource, or hands out a capability.
- You want to know whether an arbitrary signer can drive a state change on a resource they do not own.
Scope check
Audit only contracts you own or are authorized to assess, and submit a transaction only against a network in scope (a devnet or testnet, or a mainnet only with authorization), a call that passes moves real value. Adjudicate on the module source. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Resolve the visibility and the ability set first. For each function, determine who can call it (public, public entry, public-to-friend or package-internal, or private) and for each type it touches determine the abilities it carries (key, store, copy, drop). Visibility decides whether an arbitrary signer reaches the function, and the abilities decide whether a resource or capability can be duplicated or leaked, so settle both before flagging.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 135 lines · 197 tokens per session scan A 9997732eb23b
auditing-move-resource-ownership is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 197 tokens to every session and 2,058 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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