Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gapsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00167 | $0.01983 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00084 | $0.00992 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00397 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00198 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing network segmentation gaps: when every pod can reach every pod
Kubernetes networking is open by default: without a policy, every pod can talk to every other pod, every service, and often the internet and the cloud metadata endpoint. Network policy is what closes that down, so segmentation is not a property the cluster has, it is a property each namespace earns by having policies that actually constrain reachability in both directions. The gaps are predictable: a namespace with no default-deny where the whole open default still applies, a missing egress rule that lets a compromised pod exfiltrate or reach the node metadata endpoint, a selector broad enough to admit sources it never meant to, and a policy that locks ingress while egress stays wide open. Lateral movement and egress are exactly what an attacker does after a foothold, and segmentation is what limits both. You audit this by checking, per namespace and per workload, what can actually reach what.
When to use
- Network policy is the control meant to limit pod-to-pod, pod-to-service, or pod-to-external reachability.
- Namespaces may lack a default-deny, so the open-by-default reachability still applies.
- Egress may be unconstrained, letting a compromised pod reach the internet or the cloud metadata endpoint.
Scope check
Test segmentation only on clusters you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production namespaces. Probing reachability sends traffic between real pods and possibly outbound, so keep probes benign and inside the authorized namespaces, and do not exfiltrate through any egress gap you find. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish the intended reachability first. Name, per workload, what it should be able to reach and what should be able to reach it: which services, which namespaces, what egress. This is the false-positive killer: a namespace with a default-deny and explicit allow rules that match exactly the intended reachability is correctly segmented. Name the intended graph, then compare actual reachability to it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 135 lines · 167 tokens per session scan A c71e2c719ce1
auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 167 tokens to every session and 1,983 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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