Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-serverless-event-source-trustgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-serverless-event-source-trust)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-serverless-event-source-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-serverless-event-source-trust/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-serverless-event-source-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-serverless-event-source-trust.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00182 | $0.01977 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00091 | $0.00988 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00395 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00198 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-serverless-event-source-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing serverless event-source trust: when the handler trusts the event because it came from inside
Event-driven functions invert the usual request model: instead of a caller reaching an endpoint, a platform delivers an event to a handler. The recurring mistake is treating that delivery as authentication, the handler assumes the event is genuine, well-formed, and authorized simply because it came through the platform's plumbing. But the event source may accept writes from more parties than intended, the payload is attacker-influenceable input, and the same handler may be reachable by triggers it should never honor. The event payload is the source, the handler's action is the sink, and the bug is trust that was assumed rather than verified. You find it by mapping each function to what can trigger it and asking what the handler checks before it acts.
When to use
- Functions are triggered by events from queues, object-store notifications, schedules, topics, or gateways.
- A handler trusts the event payload's contents or its claimed source without verifying either.
- Per-event-type authorization or source authentication is assumed rather than checked in the handler.
Scope check
Audit functions, event sources, and execution identities you own or are authorized to assess, and inject crafted events only into non-production triggers where a spurious run is safe. A forged event can drive a real privileged action. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Map each function to its triggers and its assumptions. For every handler, identify what can invoke it, a message queue, an object-store notification, a schedule, a topic, an upstream gateway, and what the handler takes for granted: that the event came from a trusted producer, that its fields are well-formed, that the actor behind it is already authorized. Those assumptions are the surface.
-
Check whether the event's true source is verified. A handler often treats any event the platform delivers as authentic. But an event source can be writable by more parties than intended: an object store others can write to, a queue with broad send permission, a public-facing gateway. Determine whether the handler confirms the event's origin and integrity, or merely that it arrived.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 133 lines · 182 tokens per session scan A 1d53b699c51f
auditing-serverless-event-source-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 182 tokens to every session and 1,977 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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