Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trustgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00172 | $0.01908 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00069 | $0.00763 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.00382 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00191 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Terraform state and backend trust: when the state file is the crown jewels
Infrastructure state is not a build artifact; it is a live record of every resource and, very often, the plaintext of the secrets those resources were created with, database passwords, generated keys, tokens. It also drives the next apply: whatever the state says exists is what the tool reconciles against. That makes the state backend a high-value target on two axes. Anyone who can read the state file can read the secrets in it, so a backend readable by too many principals is a secret-disclosure bug. Anyone who can write or redirect the state can corrupt the next apply or point it at resources they control, so a missing lock or a mutable backend configuration is a tampering bug. You audit these by checking who can read the state, how it is protected at rest, and whether writes are locked and the backend is fixed.
When to use
- Infrastructure state is stored in a shared backend such as an object store or a remote state service.
- The state file may contain plaintext secrets from resources it manages.
- State access, encryption, versioning, locking, or backend configuration may be loose or unenforced.
Scope check
Audit state and backends only for infrastructure you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production state. Reading a state file exposes real secrets, so stay inside the authorized backend and treat any secret in state as sensitive within scope, never exfiltrating it. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Establish who legitimately needs state access first. Name the principals that must read and write the state for this infrastructure: the specific pipeline identity, the specific operators. This is the false-positive killer: a backend scoped to exactly those principals with encryption and locking is correct. Name the legitimate set, then compare actual access to it.
-
Determine what secrets the state actually holds. Read whether the managed resources write secret values into state (generated passwords, keys, connection strings). If they do, every principal who can read the state reads those secrets, so the read-access set is a secret-disclosure boundary, not just an operational one. Confirm the sensitivity of what state contains.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 133 lines · 172 tokens per session scan A a391774f0c1a
auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 172 tokens to every session and 1,908 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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