Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-tls-and-certificate-validationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00180 | $0.02070 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00072 | $0.00828 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00414 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00207 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 142 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing TLS and certificate validation: when the client accepts a certificate it should reject
Transport security fails closed by default, so almost every real finding here is code that went out of its way to weaken it. A client that turns verification off, installs a trust manager that approves any chain, skips the hostname check, or swallows an expired-certificate error will complete a handshake against an attacker's certificate and hand plaintext to whoever sits on the network path. This is not about which cipher or protocol version is chosen, that is a different audit; it is about whether the client accepts a certificate it should have rejected. You audit it by finding every outbound TLS client and asking, for each, whether verification, hostname matching, and any required pinning are enforced and fail closed on the reachable production path. The discipline is separating a genuine production bypass from a test-only flag pointed at localhost.
When to use
- Code opens an outbound TLS connection, or configures an HTTP, gRPC, database, or raw socket client.
- You see a verification flag, a custom trust manager, a hostname verifier, or a pinning routine.
- You want to know whether the client would accept a forged certificate from a network attacker.
Scope check
Test interception only against endpoints and clients you own or are authorized to assess, and stand up any man-in-the-middle only on a network in scope, intercepting a real connection captures live credentials. Prove the bypass against a controlled endpoint, not a production one. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Find the outbound TLS clients and their targets. Inventory the places the code opens a TLS connection or builds a client, and for each note the target (a real remote endpoint over the public network, or a localhost or in-cluster peer) and whether the path ships in production. The target and reachability decide whether a weakness is exploitable, so establish them before judging any flag.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 142 lines · 180 tokens per session scan A 8e663707f4f7
auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 180 tokens to every session and 2,070 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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