Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundariesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00178 | $0.02105 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00071 | $0.00842 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00421 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00211 |
Grade A, and why
auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 140 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Windows UAC and integrity boundaries: when elevation happens without a real prompt
Windows separates code that runs elevated from code that does not, marks processes with an integrity level, and asks the user to consent before a process gains administrative rights. That boundary holds only when crossing it requires either a genuine consent prompt or an existing high-integrity context. It breaks when an auto-elevating binary, one the system elevates without prompting, can be steered by a medium-integrity process into loading an input the attacker controls, when an already-elevated process consumes a file, registry value, or path a non-administrator can write, when the elevation policy is broad enough to elevate more than it should, or when an integrity level is set but does not actually gate the operation it is meant to protect. In each case a medium-integrity foothold reaches a high-integrity context without the consent the boundary promised. The bug is elevation without genuine consent. You audit these by finding every way a non-elevated process influences what an elevated one does.
When to use
- A host has auto-elevating binaries or an elevation policy and you can enumerate what they consume.
- An elevated process reads a file, registry value, or path that a non-administrator may write.
- An integrity level is relied on to gate an operation you can test from a medium-integrity context.
Scope check
Audit elevation boundaries only on hosts you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production or a snapshot, using a benign marker that proves the high-integrity context was reached rather than taking real administrative action. A confirmed crossing yields administrative rights, so keep every probe within scope. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish whether crossing the boundary needs genuine consent or an existing high context first. For each way a medium-integrity process might reach high integrity, determine whether it requires a real consent prompt or an already-elevated context, or whether an auto-elevating binary, a writable consumed input, or a permissive policy lets the crossing happen without consent. This is the false-positive killer: a boundary that always requires genuine consent or existing elevation is not crossed by a medium-integrity foothold. Name the consent-free crossing before crafting a proof.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 140 lines · 178 tokens per session scan A 8be6970efe58
auditing-windows-uac-and-integrity-boundaries is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 178 tokens to every session and 2,105 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-09.
Other skills, from other repositories
prodcheck-review
Review this codebase against the prodcheck pre-production checklists — security, performance, scale, integrations, post-launch readiness and people. Use when asked to check whether a project is ready to ship, to audit an area before launch, or to work through a specific checklist. Produces evidence with file:line…
integrate-arcjet-guard-genkit
Integrate Arcjet security into a Genkit JS agent using @arcjet/guard — wrap ai.defineTool, put guardMiddleware on generate({ use }) for unwrapped / MCP / filesystem tools, and read a caller-owned id from generate({ context }). Use when asked to add Arcjet to genkit, rate limit its tools, screen inbound messages, or…
integrate-arcjet-guard-tanstack-ai
Integrate Arcjet security into a TanStack AI chat() app using @arcjet/guard — put guardMiddleware first on chat({ middleware }) so onBeforeToolCall gates tools, and read a caller-owned id from chat({ context }). Use when asked to add Arcjet to TanStack AI, rate limit its tools, screen inbound messages, or block prompt…
integrate-arcjet-guard-claude-managed-agents
Integrate Arcjet security into Claude Managed Agents (hosted REST+SSE, beta managed-agents-2026-04-01) using @arcjet/guard — screen user.message / initialevents before sessions.events.send, and gate custom tools on agent.customtooluse. Use when asked to add Arcjet to Claude Managed Agents, rate limit custom tools, or…
linear-claude-skill
Manage Linear issues, projects, and teams.
varlock-claude-skill
Secure environment variable management ensuring secrets are never exposed in Claude sessions, terminals, logs, or git commits.