Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill hunting-crlf-and-response-splittinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00159 | $0.02146 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00064 | $0.00858 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00429 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00215 |
Grade A, and why
hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 136 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hunting CRLF and response splitting: when a newline becomes a new header
Headers, log lines, and email headers are all line-oriented: a carriage return and line feed ends one field and begins the next. When untrusted input flows into one of these unescaped, an attacker who supplies a CRLF sequence stops writing a value and starts writing structure. A newline in a redirect location injects a header, or a blank line followed by a body splits the response into a second one the attacker controls. A newline in a log line forges an entry that frames another user or hides an action. A newline in a mail header adds recipients or spoofs fields. The bug is not the input; it is a writer that concatenates untrusted text into a line-structured format without rejecting the line terminators. You find these by locating every header, log, and email write fed request data and checking whether CR and LF survive.
When to use
- Request input flows into a response header value: a Set-Cookie, a Location redirect, or a custom header.
- Log lines are written from request data (paths, user agents, identifiers) without neutralizing newlines.
- Outbound email headers (recipients, subject, from, reply-to) are built from user-supplied input.
Scope check
Test CRLF injection only against systems you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production infrastructure, using benign markers rather than live cache-poisoning or spoofed mail when you confirm. A confirmed split can affect other users through a shared cache, so keep every probe within the authorized scope and prefer an isolated instance. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish whether the writer rejects CR and LF first. For each header, log, and email sink, determine whether the runtime or framework already forbids carriage returns and line feeds in the value, or whether a hand-built string or a permissive stack passes them through. This is the false-positive killer: most modern header APIs reject bare CR and LF, so an injected newline never reaches the wire, while a manually-assembled header or an older interface may not. Name the writer's behavior before crafting input.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 136 lines · 159 tokens per session scan A 76d4ad59e2b3
hunting-crlf-and-response-splitting is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 159 tokens to every session and 2,146 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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