Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00177 | $0.02076 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00071 | $0.00830 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00035 | $0.00415 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00208 |
Grade A, and why
hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 138 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hunting hybrid app bundle and config exposure: when the shipped app carries its own secrets
A mobile app is distributed as a package that lands on every user's device, and anyone can unpack it: the code, the resources, the embedded web assets of a hybrid app, and the configuration files are all readable. That is fine for everything a client is meant to hold, and a leak for anything that was meant to stay secret. Developers ship secrets into the bundle anyway, a backend API key hardcoded in the code, a credential in a resource file, signing or encryption material in the assets, a private internal endpoint in a configuration, or a debug or feature flag left enabled that unlocks privileged behavior. Because the app is treated as though its contents were private, these are shipped as if hidden, when in fact a distributed binary is fully readable. The bug is not that the app has configuration; it is a secret or an abusable setting that anyone who unpacks the package can recover and use. You hunt these by unpacking the shipped bundle and reading everything in it as an attacker would.
When to use
- A mobile app is distributed as a package whose code, resources, and configuration you can unpack.
- A hybrid app embeds web assets and configuration files that may carry secrets or endpoints.
- The bundle may contain hardcoded keys, credentials, private endpoints, or debug and feature flags.
Scope check
Hunt bundle exposure only on apps you own or are authorized to assess, unpacking a package you are permitted to analyze and proving any recovered secret is usable against test infrastructure rather than production. A recovered key or credential authenticates or unlocks a real service, so keep every probe within scope and treat recovered material as sensitive. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
- Establish whether each recovered value is a live secret or an intended client value first. For each secret-looking string, endpoint, or flag in the bundle, determine whether it is material meant to stay secret, a backend key, a credential, signing material, a private endpoint, or a privileged toggle, or a value a client is legitimately meant to hold, a public identifier or a scoped client token that grants nothing on its own. This is the false-positive killer: a public client identifier or a properly scoped token that authorizes nothing sensitive is not a finding even though it is in the bundle. Name what the value grants before claiming exposure.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 138 lines · 177 tokens per session scan A fd8658ccda8a
hunting-hybrid-app-bundle-and-config-exposure is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 177 tokens to every session and 2,076 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-09.
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