hunting-os-command-injection

hunting-os-command-injection is a skill for Claude Code from UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills. It costs 177 tokens per session (2,017 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security review for code that runs operating-system commands using untrusted input. It checks whether a shell interprets that input as command syntax instead of treating it as a separate argument.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to inspect system calls, shell-enabled process spawning, composed command strings, environment values, working directories, and PATH handling.
Why use it?
Shell characters such as semicolons, pipes, and command substitutions can add or replace commands when input is passed through a shell. Direct execution with fixed arguments avoids this specific risk.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Part of the security-agent-skills plugin — 194 skills shipped together

Good fit Use it to inspect system calls, shell-enabled process spawning, composed command strings, environment values, working directories, and PATH handling.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill hunting-os-command-injection
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install security-agent-skills, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 194 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for hunting-os-command-injection

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for hunting-os-command-injection

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-os-command-injection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 177 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,017 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00177 $0.02017
Opus 5.5 $0.00071 $0.00807
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00035 $0.00403
Haiku 4.5 $0.00018 $0.00202

Measured 1mo ago against content hash d783fe805f01, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

hunting-os-command-injection scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/hunting-os-command-injection/SKILL.md · 132 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 132 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Hunting OS command injection: when input crosses into a shell

Command injection happens when untrusted input reaches a process-spawning API in a way that lets a shell interpret it. A shell treats characters like the semicolon, the pipe, the ampersand, backticks, and dollar parentheses as syntax, so an input that carries them can chain, substitute, or replace the intended command. The single fact that decides whether the class exists is whether a shell is in the loop: a call that composes a string and hands it to a system shell is injectable, while a direct exec that passes a fixed program and a separate argument vector, with no shell, is not, because the arguments are delivered as data. You find command injection by locating every spawn, deciding whether it goes through a shell, and tracing whether untrusted input reaches the command portion of a shell-interpreted call.

When to use

  • Code runs an external command built from, or including, request or stored input.
  • A spawn API is called in shell mode, or with a single composed string rather than an argument vector.
  • Input influences the environment, the working directory, or the PATH of a spawned process.

Scope check

Test command injection only against systems you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production hosts, because a confirmed case runs commands on the server. Prove the class with an inert, side-effect-free command (an echo or a fixed delay) rather than anything destructive, and stay within the authorized host. If you can't name the authorization, stop.

The loop

  1. Establish whether a shell is in the loop first. For each spawn, determine whether it invokes a shell (a system-style call, a shell-mode flag, or a single composed command string) or is a direct exec with a fixed program and a separate argument vector. This is the false-positive killer: a shell-less exec does not interpret metacharacters, so untrusted arguments there are not command injection, even though they may be argument injection, a separate concern. Name the spawn mode before judging the input.

Read the full file on GitHub · 132 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 132 lines · 177 tokens per session scan A d783fe805f01

Subscribe to this mod's changes

hunting-os-command-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 177 tokens to every session and 2,017 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.

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