hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization

hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization is a skill for Claude Code from UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills. It costs 153 tokens per session (1,927 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security hunt for unsafe Python deserialization, where loading specially crafted data can construct objects and run functions. It covers formats and loaders such as pickle, unsafe YAML, marshal, dill, jsonpickle, and loaders that use pickle internally.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to trace untrusted bytes into Python object loaders and model, checkpoint, or dataframe loading code.
Why use it?
It finds cases where attacker-controlled requests, cookies, caches, queues, files, models, or dataframes can trigger code execution during loading.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Part of the security-agent-skills plugin — 194 skills shipped together

Good fit Use it to trace untrusted bytes into Python object loaders and model, checkpoint, or dataframe loading code.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install security-agent-skills, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 194 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization

README.md
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Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 153 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,927 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00153 $0.01927
Opus 5.5 $0.00061 $0.00771
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00031 $0.00385
Haiku 4.5 $0.00015 $0.00193

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 49ad7c153f43, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization/SKILL.md · 131 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Hunting Python unsafe deserialization: when loading data calls a function

Several Python serialization formats are not data formats at all; they are programs. pickle invokes __reduce__ during load, which names a callable and its arguments and runs them, so a pickled blob can call any importable function on reconstruction. YAML's full loader instantiates arbitrary Python objects from tags. marshal, dill, jsonpickle, and the model and dataframe loaders that wrap pickle inherit the same property. The vulnerability is not a bug in these libraries; it is using them on data an attacker controls. You find it by locating every loader that reconstructs objects rather than parsing data, and asking whether untrusted bytes reach it.

When to use

  • A service loads serialized Python objects from a request, a cookie, a cache, a queue, or a file.
  • The loader in use reconstructs arbitrary objects: pickle, unsafe YAML, marshal, dill, or jsonpickle.
  • A model, dataframe, or checkpoint file from an untrusted source is loaded through a pickling loader.

Scope check

Test deserialization only against services you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production data. A confirming payload runs code on load, so treat every proof as a live intrusion inside the authorized scope. If you can't name the authorization, stop.

The loop

  1. Establish the reconstructing loaders first. Inventory every call that reconstructs objects rather than parsing data: pickle.loads/load, yaml.load without a safe loader, marshal.loads, dill, jsonpickle.decode, and model or dataframe loaders that unpickle internally. This is the false-positive killer: a json.loads or a yaml.safe_load parses data and cannot construct arbitrary objects. Name the reconstructing sinks first.

  2. Trace untrusted bytes into each loader. Follow request bodies, cookies, headers, cache entries, queue messages, and uploaded or downloaded files into the loader. A model checkpoint or a dataframe pulled from an untrusted registry, a shared bucket, or a user upload is attacker-influenced the moment its provenance is not controlled. Confirm the bytes crossing the boundary are not internal-only.

Read the full file on GitHub · 131 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 131 lines · 153 tokens per session scan A 49ad7c153f43

Subscribe to this mod's changes

hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 153 tokens to every session and 1,927 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.

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