Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00162 | $0.01979 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00065 | $0.00792 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00396 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00198 |
Grade A, and why
hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hunting setuid and capability escalation: elevated identity plus a primitive
A program that runs as a more privileged identity is only safe if it does exactly one narrow thing and exposes no way to turn that privilege into an arbitrary action. The bug is the pairing: an elevated identity (the setuid or setgid bit, or a file capability) next to a reachable primitive (spawn a shell or command, read or write a file, load a library) that an unprivileged user can steer. You find it by enumerating everything that carries elevated identity on the host, and for each asking what an unprivileged caller can make it do as that identity.
When to use
- You are auditing a host, container image, or package for local privilege escalation.
- Binaries carry the setuid or setgid bit, or files are granted per-file capabilities.
- Some of those programs are custom, bundled by a vendor, or left over from install.
Scope check
Audit local privilege escalation only on hosts or images you own or are authorized to test, with an unprivileged account you may escalate from. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Enumerate every carrier of elevated identity. Inventory all setuid and setgid binaries and all files granted a capability, across the whole filesystem including mounted images and package payloads. Note the owning identity each escalates to and the specific capability granted (changing user id, overriding file-permission checks, raw disk or memory access, module loading, binding low ports). This inventory is the whole attack surface; do not scope it to a guessed shortlist.
-
Classify each by the primitive it exposes. For each carrier, determine what an unprivileged caller can drive it to do as the elevated identity: run a shell or an arbitrary command, read a file it chooses, write a file it chooses, load a library, or only a single fixed action with no attacker-influenced input. A carrier with an exec, read, write, or library-load primitive is the lead; one with none is likely fine.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 146 lines · 162 tokens per session scan A 9e742368754a
hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 162 tokens to every session and 1,979 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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