Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills --skill mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reachgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00166 | $0.01925 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00066 | $0.00770 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00033 | $0.00385 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00193 |
Grade A, and why
mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 132 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Mapping pod-to-cloud credential reach: the blast radius of one compromised pod
A pod on a cloud-hosted cluster is rarely just a container; it is a holder of cloud credentials. It may bind to a workload identity, mount a service-account token that federates to a cloud role, or simply sit on a node whose instance role is reachable through the node metadata endpoint. So the real question about a pod is not what it does but what its credentials reach: if this pod is compromised, which cloud APIs, data stores, and other identities does its token open, and can it chain from there to something larger. The dangerous pattern is a modest workload holding a broad credential, or any pod able to reach the node role, because the blast radius is the credential, not the application. You map this by identifying every credential a pod holds or can reach and enumerating what each can do.
When to use
- Pods obtain cloud credentials through workload identity federation, mounted tokens, or the node role.
- The node metadata endpoint may be reachable from pods, exposing the node instance role.
- You need the blast radius of a pod compromise: which cloud resources and identities its credentials reach.
Scope check
Map credential reach only in cloud accounts and clusters you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production identities. Enumerating what a credential can do exercises real cloud APIs, so use read-only enumeration where possible and never use a reached credential to alter or exfiltrate. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
The loop
-
Establish each pod's intended cloud access first. Name what cloud resources each workload legitimately needs: a specific bucket, a specific queue, nothing. This is the false-positive killer: a pod bound to a narrowly scoped identity that reaches only what it needs, with the node role unreachable, is correct. Name the intended reach, then enumerate the actual reach.
-
Identify every credential the pod holds. List the cloud identity the pod binds to through workload identity federation and any service-account token or key mounted into it. Each is a credential a compromised process inside the pod can use. Note which identity each maps to in the cloud.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 132 lines · 166 tokens per session scan A cc9e624593ed
mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach is a skill published in the GitHub repository UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 166 tokens to every session and 1,925 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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