Strix is an open-source penetration-testing tool that uses autonomous AI agents to inspect applications, exploit vulnerabilities, and validate findings with working proofs of concept. Developers and security teams use it for application security testing, bug-bounty research, remediation guidance, reporting, and automated checks in development pipelines.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add usestrix/strix --skill owasp-top-10-testinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/usestrix/strixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/usestrix/strix/owasp-top-10-testing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/usestrix/strix/owasp-top-10-testing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/usestrix/strix/owasp-top-10-testing/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/usestrix/strix/owasp-top-10-testing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/usestrix/strix/owasp-top-10-testing.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket warn
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00151 | $0.01405 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00060 | $0.00562 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.00281 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00140 |
Grade A, and why
owasp-top-10-testing scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 65 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Test against the OWASP Top 10
The OWASP Top 10 is a taxonomy of risk categories, not a test suite — "OWASP Top 10 testing" means exercising each category against the real application and reporting what's actually exploitable. Strix's agents do the exploitation; this skill covers running it category-by-category and reporting coverage honestly.
Use the current edition: OWASP Top 10:2025 (8th installment, superseding 2021). Ask the user before targeting an older edition — some compliance checklists still reference 2021, and a report labelled with the wrong edition is misleading. Key differences from 2021: SSRF is folded into A01, A03 Software Supply Chain Failures expands the old "Vulnerable and Outdated Components", and A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions is new; A02 Security Misconfiguration moved 5→2.
Install, LLM setup, and the managed-cloud alternative: penetration-testing-with-strix. For a run with no Docker and no LLM key, the same binary drives the managed platform: strix cloud login, then strix cloud scans start ... (details in managed-pentesting-with-strix).
What is and is not testable by an agent
Be straight with the user about this — claiming a clean sweep of all ten is misleading.
| Category (2025) | Coverage |
|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF) | Strong — cross-user/tenant access, privilege escalation, IDOR, and SSRF (including blind, via out-of-band callbacks) are all exploit-validated. Needs two accounts plus a privileged one to prove the authorization half. |
| A02 Security Misconfiguration | Strong — debug endpoints, verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing hardening, default credentials, exposed admin surfaces. |
| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | Partial — version fingerprinting, and vulnerable/outdated dependency review when source is supplied. Build-system and distribution-infrastructure compromise (the broader half of this category) is out of scope for a runtime scan — pair with SCA plus build-provenance controls. |
| A04 Cryptographic Failures | Partial — transport config, unencrypted data in transit, secrets and tokens leaked in responses. At-rest crypto and key management need source or infra review. |
| A05 Injection | Strong — SQL/NoSQL/command/template injection and XSS, exploit-validated. |
| A06 Insecure Design | Partial — business-logic abuse (price/quantity tampering, workflow skipping, race conditions) is found where reachable; design intent still needs human review and threat modelling. |
| A07 Authentication Failures | Strong — auth bypass, weak session/token handling, password-reset and MFA flaws. |
| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures | Partial — insecure deserialization and unsigned-update paths where reachable; CI/CD trust boundaries are not runtime-testable. |
| A09 Security Logging & Alerting Failures | Not testable from outside — requires reviewing the logging and alerting pipeline. State this rather than reporting it as passed. |
| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | Partial — agents actively probe error handling and fail-open behavior (malformed input, forced errors, race and timeout conditions) and report what leaks or bypasses a control; exhaustive coverage of internal error paths needs source review. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed 02b1cbe60d40
- 1mo ago First seen · 65 lines · 151 tokens per session scan A 257dddbcd7a1
owasp-top-10-testing is a skill published in the GitHub repository usestrix/strix (70,081 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 151 tokens to every session and 1,405 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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