Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/vigilantshield/claude-hunterkit/bugbounty-masternpx skills add vigilantshield/Claude-HunterKit --skill bugbounty-mastergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vigilantshield/Claude-HunterKitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vigilantshield/claude-hunterkit/bugbounty-master)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vigilantshield/claude-hunterkit/bugbounty-master"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vigilantshield/claude-hunterkit/bugbounty-master.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00156 | $0.20929 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00078 | $0.10465 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00031 | $0.04186 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.02093 |
Grade F, and why
bugbounty-01 scanned grade F with 7 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitHub UI but included i Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Hidden instructionshighPrompt injection
Directives inside HTML comments, invisible characters or bidirectional overrides are read by the model and not by the person reviewing the file.
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitHub UI but included i Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
4. **Payload stealth** — tj-actions memdump.py: extract secrets from Runner.Worker process memory via `/proc/PID/maps` + `/proc/PID/mem`, encrypt with AES+RSA, output to workflow log. Logs are publicly visible but encryp Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com/") Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rn "eval(\|innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInner\|execSync" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" | grep -v node_modules The source is not reproduced here
No licence file
A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 1,667 lines · 156 tokens per session scan F 79ee5a207b8c
bugbounty-01 is a skill published in the GitHub repository vigilantshield/Claude-HunterKit (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), with no licence file. It adds 156 tokens to every session and 20,929 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it F with 7 findings (instruction-override phrasing, hidden instructions, sends data to an external url). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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