Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit --skill security-scangit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit/security-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit/security-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit/security-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.01126 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00450 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00225 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00113 |
Grade A, and why
security-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 103 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Vulnerability Scan
Automated Secret Detection
!git grep -rn "api_key\|apikey\|api-key\|secret\|password\|passwd\|token\|bearer\|private_key\|access_key\|client_secret\|auth_token" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py" --include="*.go" --include="*.rs" --include="*.java" --include="*.rb" --include="*.cs" --include="*.env*" --include="*.yml" --include="*.yaml" --include="*.json" --include="*.toml" --include="*.cfg" --include="*.ini" --include="*.conf" 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git | grep -v vendor | grep -v "\.lock" | grep -v "test" | grep -vi "example\|placeholder\|your_\|TODO\|FIXME\|change_me" | head -30
Environment Files Check
!find . -name ".env*" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" 2>/dev/null
!cat .gitignore 2>/dev/null | grep -i "env\|secret\|key\|credential" || echo "WARNING: .gitignore may not exclude secret files"
Vulnerability Checklist
Scan the codebase systematically for each vulnerability class. For every finding:
- Severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low
- File path and line number
- Vulnerability type (CWE ID if known)
- Description of the risk
- Remediation steps with code
1. Injection Flaws
- SQL Injection: String concatenation in queries instead of parameterized/prepared statements
- NoSQL Injection: Unsanitized user input in MongoDB/DynamoDB queries
- Command Injection: User input passed to
exec,system,os.popen,subprocesswithout sanitization - LDAP Injection: Unsanitized input in LDAP queries
- Path Traversal: User input in file paths without normalization (
../../../etc/passwd) - Template Injection: User input rendered in templates without escaping (SSTI)
2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Unescaped user input rendered in HTML
dangerouslySetInnerHTML/v-html/|safewith user content- Reflected XSS via URL parameters
- Stored XSS via database content rendered without sanitization
- DOM-based XSS via
document.write,innerHTML,eval
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 103 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A f3ee0b33ca3f
security-scan is a skill published in the GitHub repository viknesh20-20/claude-code-tool-kit (7 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,126 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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