Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill detecting-azure-lateral-movementgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-azure-lateral-movement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-azure-lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-azure-lateral-movement/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-azure-lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-azure-lateral-movement.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.00950 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00475 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00190 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00095 |
Grade A, and why
detecting-azure-lateral-movement scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 94 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Detecting Azure Lateral Movement
Overview
Lateral movement in Azure AD/Entra ID differs from on-premises environments. Attackers pivot through OAuth application consent grants, service principal abuse, cross-tenant access policies, and stolen refresh tokens rather than SMB/RDP connections. Detection requires correlating Microsoft Graph API audit logs, Azure AD sign-in logs, and Entra ID protection risk events using KQL queries in Microsoft Sentinel. This skill covers building detection analytics for common Azure lateral movement techniques including application impersonation, mailbox delegation abuse, and conditional access policy bypasses.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure lateral movement
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Detection Gaps & Validation
Common evasions / false-negatives that defeat these KQL analytics:
- Watching only
SigninLogs. Refresh-token and PRT replay land inAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs; app-only pivots land inAADServicePrincipalSignInLogs. Interactive-only queries miss both. - Cross-tenant B2B pivots show
ResultType == 0withResourceTenantId != HomeTenantId— filter on the tenant mismatch, not just location. - Mailbox delegation abuse (
Add-MailboxPermissionFullAccess/SendAs,Add delegated permission grant) is in the Office 365 / Exchange audit feed, not EntraAuditLogs. - Credential-add detail is buried in
TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[*].newValue(KeyDescription / KeyType) — keying only onOperationNamemisses cert-based persistence.
Validate the rule actually fires:
union withsource=Tbl AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs, SigninLogs
| summarize rows=count() by Tbl // any 0 = diagnostic setting missing, rule is silently dead
- Tune FP by baselining each service principal's sign-in IP/location over 14+ days before alerting on "new" location, and exclude managed-identity object IDs and known automation egress IPs.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 94 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 993221d49b68
detecting-azure-lateral-movement is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (972 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 950 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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