Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill detecting-compromised-cloud-credentialsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.03759 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.01879 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00752 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00376 |
Grade A, and why
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 351 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Detecting Compromised Cloud Credentials
When to Use
- When investigating alerts about unusual cloud API activity from unfamiliar locations
- When building detection rules for credential theft and abuse across cloud environments
- When responding to notifications from cloud providers about exposed credentials
- When monitoring for credential stuffing or brute force attacks against cloud identities
- When assessing the scope of a credential compromise after initial detection
Do not use for preventing credential compromise (use MFA, credential rotation, and secrets management), for detecting application-level credential theft (use application security monitoring), or for endpoint credential harvesting detection (use EDR tools).
Detection Gaps & Validation
False-negatives that hide a live credential compromise:
- Instance-credential exfil has two variants.
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWSflips to.InsideAWSwhen the attacker proxies through another AWS account — include both infinding-criteriaor you miss the AWS-internal pivot. - Federated/SSO console logins may not populate
responseElements.ConsoleLogin == "Success"; the signal lands inadditionalEventData/AssumeRoleWithSAMLinstead, so aConsoleLogin-only query misses SSO accounts. - Azure
riskLevelDuringSignInrequires Entra ID P2. Without P2,riskEventTypes_v2is empty and every risk query returns zero — a silent dead rule, not a clean tenant. - GCP service-account key usage needs Data Access audit logs (
DATA_READ/ADMIN_READ) explicitly enabled per service — off by default, soprincipalEmail:*.iam.gserviceaccount.comqueries see nothing. - The
unique_ips > 3impossible-travel heuristic misses low-and-slow single-residential-proxy abuse and false-positives on NAT/VPN.
Validate: confirm CloudTrail, SigninLogs, and GCP audit logs each return rows for the last 24h before trusting "no findings"; FP-tune impossible travel by allowlisting corporate egress and VPN CIDRs.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 351 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A b8470eb4cf69
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (958 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 3,759 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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