xalgorix/xalgorix is a self-hosted AI penetration-testing tool in which an LLM agent performs reconnaissance, looks for vulnerabilities, and coordinates exploitation, while a separate verifier re-tests findings before reporting them. It is for security teams, ethical hackers, and bug bounty work using a private, bring-your-own-LLM setup. The catalogue skills extend the agent's pentesting workflow.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00097 | $0.02940 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00039 | $0.01176 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00588 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00294 |
Grade A, and why
detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 26d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 270 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Detecting Evasion Techniques in Endpoint Logs
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Hunting for adversary defense evasion techniques (MITRE ATT&CK TA0005) in endpoint telemetry
- Building detection rules for common evasion methods (process injection, timestomping, log clearing)
- Investigating incidents where adversaries disabled or bypassed security tools
- Analyzing endpoint logs for indicators of living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse
Do not use this skill for network-level evasion (use network traffic analysis) or for malware reverse engineering.
Detection Gaps & Validation
- Direct syscalls / unhooking defeat API-based rules: tools using direct or indirect syscalls (SysWhispers, Hell's Gate) or that unhook ntdll bypass userland EDR hooks, so CreateRemoteThread (Sysmon EID 8) may never fire. Backstop with Sysmon EID 10 (ProcessAccess to lsass, GrantedAccess
0x1010/0x1410) and ETW-Ti / kernel telemetry, not just hook-based detections. - Log source not actually enabled: evasion hunting silently fails if 4688 has no command line (
ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled=1) or the Sysmon config excludes EID 8/10. The SwiftOnSecurity / Olaf Hartong base configs comment these out in places — confirm the events are present before trusting a clean hunt. - AMSI/ETW bypass blinds script logging:
amsi.dllpatching and ETW patching (ntdll!EtwEventWrite) suppress 4104 script-block and AMSI events. Treat 4104 text containingAmsiUtils/amsiInitFailed, or a sudden stop in PowerShell Operational events, as the detection itself. - Timestomping confirmed by correlation, not one event: compare Sysmon EID 2 (file-create-time changed) against EID 11 create time and
$STANDARD_INFORMATIONvs$FILE_NAMEMFT timestamps. - Validate each rule fires: run the matching Atomic Red Team test — T1070.001 (
wevtutil cl), T1562.001 (Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring), T1055 (process injection), T1218 LOLBins (mshta/regsvr32/certutil) — and confirm the alert reaches the SIEM. Tune false positives with an allowlist of legitimate injectors (AV, accessibility tools) and parent-process context rather than disabling the rule.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 26d ago First seen · 270 lines · 97 tokens per session scan A f450aed852a5
detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (1,234 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 2,940 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-29.
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