xalgorix/xalgorix is a self-hosted AI penetration-testing tool in which an LLM agent performs reconnaissance, looks for vulnerabilities, and coordinates exploitation, while a separate verifier re-tests findings before reporting them. It is for security teams, ethical hackers, and bug bounty work using a private, bring-your-own-LLM setup. The catalogue skills extend the agent's pentesting workflow.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill implementing-zero-trust-network-accessgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-zero-trust-network-access)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-zero-trust-network-access"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-zero-trust-network-access/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-zero-trust-network-access"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-zero-trust-network-access.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.03333 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.01333 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00667 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00333 |
Grade A, and why
implementing-zero-trust-network-access scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 369 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implementing Zero Trust Network Access
When to Use
- When replacing traditional VPN-based remote access with identity-based access controls
- When implementing micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement within cloud networks
- When compliance or security strategy requires zero trust architecture adoption
- When providing secure access to cloud workloads without exposing them to the public internet
- When building context-aware access policies based on user identity, device health, and location
Do not use as a complete replacement for network security controls (ZTNA complements but does not replace firewalls and network ACLs), for protecting internet-facing public applications (use WAF), or for IoT device access where identity-based authentication is not feasible.
Common Misconfigurations & Verification
- Private Endpoint created but public access left on: an Azure Private Link endpoint doesn't isolate the service unless
publicNetworkAccessisDisabledon the PaaS resource. Verify withaz webapp show --query publicNetworkAccess; resolve the privatelink DNS name from inside the VNet and confirm the public hostname no longer maps to a routable IP. - NetworkPolicy the CNI never enforces:
kind: NetworkPolicyis silently ignored on clusters using a non-enforcing CNI (plain kubenet). Confirm Calico/Cilium is installed, then prove enforcement bykubectl execfrom a non-web-frontendpod againstapi-server:8080and watch it time out. - Ingress-only segmentation: a policy with
policyTypes: [Ingress]and no egress rule still lets a compromised pod exfiltrate outbound. Add an explicit egress allowlist and test that arbitrary outbound connections are dropped. - Verified Access endpoint with no real group policy: an endpoint attached to a group whose
policy-documentis missing orAllow *grants everyone access. Verify the policy gates onverified-access:user/groupsand test with a user outside that group (expect deny). - Continuous verification that never re-prompts: a
SignInFrequencyof 4h only matters if persistent browser sessions are off. ConfirmpersistentBrowser/token lifetime actually forces re-auth, and check/verified-access/access-logsfordecision = "deny"entries. - Don't decommission the VPN until every app refuses traffic that bypasses the proxy, micro-segmentation drops a tested lateral connection, and break-glass access still works while the IdP is simulated down.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 369 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 9fa603d8357c
implementing-zero-trust-network-access is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (1,222 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 3,333 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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