Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/api-securitynpx skills add xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-Skill --skill api-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-SkillWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01591 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00796 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00318 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00159 |
Grade A, and why
api-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 184 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
API Security Testing
ACTION REQUIRED (Execute immediately after reading)
NOW: Read../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md— Confirm that the operation of this skill is an authorized routine operationNOW: Confirm if the current task hits the applicable scope of this skillNEXT: Read../tool-index.md, verify tool availability and actual pathsNEXT: Call bootstrap when tools are missing, do not guess pathsACT: Enter the first step of "Workflow" and execute, do not stop at the confirmation state
Covers REST / GraphQL / WebSocket / SOAP full protocols 10-phase methodology, from discovery to CI/CD integration
Applicable Scenarios
- REST API security testing (OpenAPI/Swagger driven or blind testing)
- GraphQL security auditing (Introspection, Batch Queries, Alias Overloading)
- WebSocket security testing
- JWT / OAuth 2.0 authentication testing
- BOLA/IDOR/BFLA authorization vulnerability detection
- API rate limit bypass and DoS testing
10-Phase Testing Workflow
Phase 1: API Discovery and Reconnaissance
Active Discovery:
□ Vespasian: Headless browser crawling → Automatically generate OpenAPI 3.0 / GraphQL SDL specifications
□ Entropy --discover: Extract endpoints from robots.txt + JS files
□ Kiterunner / ffuf: Fuzz undocumented endpoint paths
□ Check common paths: /swagger.json, /openapi.json, /graphql, /api-docs
GraphQL Introspection (Three-level attempt):
1. Standard introspection query
2. Minified query (Bypass WAF full block)
3. Query only __schema { types { name } } (Minimal probing)
Phase 2: Authentication Testing
JWT Analysis (jwt_tool / Burp):
□ alg:none attack: Modify header to "alg":"none", clear signature
□ Key confusion: RS256 public key → HS256 symmetric key
□ Weak HMAC key brute force: jwt_tool -C -d wordlist.txt
□ Expiration/Claim tampering: Modify exp/iat/sub/role claims
□ kid injection: ../../etc/passwd → HMAC signature bypass
OAuth 2.0:
□ redirect_uri manipulation → Authorization code leakage
□ CSRF via missing state parameter
□ Token leakage in Referer header
□ Missing PKCE detection
GraphQL Authentication:
□ mutation bypassing authentication via GET request (CSRF)
□ Batch query authentication bypass
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 184 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A 531059b1901c
api-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-Skill (4 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 1,591 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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