Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-Skill --skill database-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-SkillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/database-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/database-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/database-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/database-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xamirhamza77/reverseops-skill/database-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.00402 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00161 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00080 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00040 |
Grade A, and why
database-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Database Security Assessment
ACTION REQUIRED (Execute immediately after reading)
NOW: Read precedent-pentest; destructive statements on production databases are prohibited unless explicitly permittedNOW: The scope must clearly state instances, account permissions, and whether write/delete is allowedNEXT: Client tool pathsACT: Exposure surface → Authentication → Authorization → Configuration → Exploit chain validation (safe)
Applicable Scenarios
- Database unauthorized/weak password/incorrect binding to 0.0.0.0
- Excessive permissions, dangerous features (xp_cmdshell, COPY PROGRAM, UDF)
- Lateral movement: From application account to DBA
- NoSQL injection and Redis file writing, etc. (authorized environments)
Workflow
□ Network exposure and TLS
□ Account roles and grantees
□ Sensitive table access control
□ Dangerous configurations: file_priv, xp_cmdshell, load_file
□ Are audit logs enabled?
□ Backup and snapshot permissions
Toolchain
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Official CLIs | Connection and enumeration |
| sqlmap | Injection validation (authorized) |
| nuclei | Known exposure templates |
| Cloud RDS console audit | Configuration |
References
references/db-misconfig-checklist.md../pentest-tools/../cloud-k8s/
Routing Context
Upstream: MASTER R35
Downstream: Gaining OS command → attack-chain; Cloud managed → cloud-k8s
Task Completion Self-Check
- Was unauthorized write/delete avoided?
- Were configuration issues and exploitable chains differentiated?
- Checklist completed?
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 56 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 82889cd861d7
database-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository xAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-Skill (5 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 402 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
database-security compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| database-securityxAmirHamza77/ReverseOps-Skill | Skill | 5 | 3mo ago | MIT | A | 37 | Claude Code, Codex |
| requirement-alignmentbaixinghao/intent-gate | Skill | 3 | 12d ago | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code |
| tencent-pg-inspectionTencentCloudCommunity/mcp-server | Skill | 32 | 3mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 68 | Claude Code, Codex |
| tencent-pg-ops-troubleshooterTencentCloudCommunity/mcp-server | Skill | 32 | 3mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 72 | Claude Code, Codex |
| tencent-pg-slowquery-diagnosisTencentCloudCommunity/mcp-server | Skill | 32 | 3mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 75 | Claude Code, Codex |
| building-mcp-serverscyberreinxy/mcp-server-skill | Skill | 1 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 160 | Claude Code, Codex |
| guardian-cache1999AZZAR/project-guardian-mcp-server | Skill | 3 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 41 | Codex |