Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xChechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack --skill auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xChechi/xche-ai-app-security-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xchechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack/audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xchechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack/audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xchechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack/audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xchechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack/audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xchechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack/audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00571 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00285 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00114 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 36 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security audit
Audit the code I've selected (or the most recent changes) for security issues.
Use the checklist below. For full rationale, see reference/SECURITY.md in this
plugin directory.
Check for
- Secrets — hardcoded keys/tokens/DB URLs; secrets in client code, logs, URLs, or errors; missing
.envgitignore. - Injection — string-built SQL (concatenation/f-strings/
.format()/%);dangerouslySetInnerHTML/innerHTML/v-html/document.writewith user input; shell/eval/unsafe deserialization; missing server-side validation. - Access control — endpoints that read/write objects without verifying ownership/permission server-side (IDOR/BOLA); missing tenant scoping; unprotected admin/debug routes; mass assignment of role/owner/price/tenant.
- Auth & sessions — weak password hashing (MD5/SHA-1/unsalted); no rate limiting on auth; cookies missing
HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite; secrets/PII in JWT or signed-cookie payloads. - API & network — missing security headers (CSP/HSTS/X-Frame-Options/nosniff); wildcard CORS on authed endpoints; SSRF (user-controlled request targets, no private-range block); open redirect; unsafe file uploads; path traversal.
- Dependencies — hallucinated/slopsquatted package names; unpinned versions; known-vulnerable deps.
- LLM/MCP — model/tool output used without validation or encoding; un-sandboxed MCP servers; commands not allow-listed by absolute path; secrets/unminimized PII sent to models; high-impact actions without human confirmation.
- Errors/logging — stack traces, SQL, or internal paths leaked to clients; secrets/PII in logs.
Output format
For each finding:
- Severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low
- Location:
file:line - Issue: one sentence
- Fix: the concrete change (show the corrected pattern)
Order findings by severity. Be concise and actionable. If nothing is found in a category, skip it rather than padding the report.
This is a baseline review, not a guarantee. Business-logic flaws and novel issues still need human judgment. For money/auth/PII code, recommend a full audit.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 36 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A c910262c8bd3
audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository xChechi/xche-ai-app-security-pack (5 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 571 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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